Imperialism: The Highest Form of State Capitalism?

Regarding Africa, I expect two things between the US and China. Right now China is investing $$$ in Africa but trying to avoid military entanglements (same for China in Middle East). The US is investing in mostly military alliances (not in the NATO sense but more like fluid, short-term and shifting alliances) that's working very well against al-Shabab in Somalia. We're engaging in some "capacity building" as well (water, clinics, etc) but I expect that we'll have to advance investment in bigger projects and China will find itself drawn into local conflicts to protect its interests.

The title of this post is taken from Vladimir's Lenin's famous treatise, "Imperialism: The Highest Form of Capitalism," in which he offers the Bolshevik perspective on WW I. It's often compared with John Hobson's work on empire, also from the early 20th century.  State Capitalism is a characterization of the Chinese business model. The name is self-explanatory, the question is whether it is sustainable against global free market forces and domestic turmoil should the model begin to lag in implementation. 

Here is a very useful map of Africa illustrating Chinese investments on the continent. The map was published in August 2012 in Business Insider.

In this online publication from Zimbabwe, issue is taken with a recent book that praised China as an investment partner for Africa. It's an illustrative case of the broader, global puzzle into which this debate fits. This portion is telling:

China’s opaque business dealings with dictatorships reveal that it is not interested in the development of the country and communities where it operates from, hence it pays little regard to business ethics, transparency and accountability.

While the Chinese played an important role in the decolonisation process on the African continent, and Zimbabwe in particular, I’m afraid its involvement in the country now is retrogressive as it is only concerned with extraction, not development. While failing to promote development in Africa, China has however successfully helped to prop up repressive regimes which are mortgaging their resources to it.
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It's difficult to not observe China's behavior and not associate it with long-standing notions of neo-imperialism.  The goal is wholly material and not in the least social:  deals are made for the extraction of vital natural resources, with socio-political concerns not part of the equation. Even assuming China remains disengaged from direct involvement in political and military affairs in Zimbabwe and elsewhere, there are consequences to not acting and there are consequences to the development that is taking place. The Zimbabwean quoted above notwithstanding, consider the long-term effects of China's investments in universities.  First, there is the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.  Just on the opening page of FOCAC's webpage are a few new headlines that exemplify where I'm going with this:

Congo borrowing $1.1 billion USD from China
Chinese firms set up railway technology training center in Nigeria
Africa becomes largest Chinese medicine export market

At this past summer's FOCAC meeting, President Hu Jintao himself announced new levels of Chinese support for training and education in Africa, as summarized here (quoted below); the full text of the speech is here


“China will implement the African Talents Programme to train 30,000 personnel in various sectors, offer 18,000 government scholarships and build cultural and vocational training facilities....China will continue to implement the China-Africa Joint Research and Exchange Plan to sponsor 100 programmes for research, exchange and cooperation by academic institutions and scholars of the two sides."

“China and Africa should increase cultural and people-to-people exchanges and encourage exchanges and interactions between the two sides in education, culture, science and technology, health, sports and tourism.”

Hu Jintao said China had trained close to 40,000 Africans in various sectors and provided more than 20,000 government scholarships to people in African countries.

“China and Africa have set up 29 Confucius Institutes in 22 African countries. Twenty pairs of leading Chinese and African universities have entered into cooperation under the 20+20 Cooperation Plan for Chinese and African Institutions of Higher Education,” he added.

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Have a look at the Confucius Institutes referenced above here.

These exercises in soft power will not necessarily spare China from entanglement in African political affairs. As China is learning at home, education, skills, and jobs lead to public expectations that these qualities of life will continue, and that they will pay off benefits beyond the family throughout civil society. Evolving public expectations often challenge the prevailing social order; we can look to the Arab Spring and to the 100,000 annual protests in China itself for ideas of what can come next.

More immediately, even the extent of contact China has established in Africa has brought out tensions, which the United States sees as opportunities. Some examples are cited in this Christian Science Monitor article covering Secretary Clinton's August trip to Africa this past August.

This report by the Congressional Research Service from June, 2012, contains much useful information.  A textbox within the report contains this summary:

Comparing Chinese and U.S. Trade with Africa

The value of total trade between China and Africa stood at $8.9 billion in the year 2000. In 2009, Chinese-African trade, totaling $70.4 billion, surpassed that of U.S.-Africa trade ($62 billion), and reached $127.3 billion in 2011, an increase of 1,423% over the 2000 level.25 Africa’s share of global Chinese trade also grew over the past decade, from 1.9% of Chinese global trade in 2000 to 3.5% of China’s global trade in 2011. China is also Africa’s largest single source of imports, while the United States is its largest export destination. In 2011, about 62% of African exports to China consisted of crude oil (over $24.77 billion of which came from Angola, the source of over 9% of China’s oil imports in 2011). Another 34% was made up of raw materials, mostly metal commodities and wood. Oil also dominates Africa’s exports to the United States; crude oil made up about 75% of U.S. imports from Africa in 2011. Both China and the United States export a highly diverse, variable array of products to Africa, notably equipment, machinery, vehicles, and other technology. U.S.-African trade has also grown over the past decade, but not as rapidly as Sino-African trade.
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It's a rather remarkable stat -- 1,423% in 11 years. The as yet unsaid factor in this neo-colonial race through Africa is the difference between the American model of foreign direct investment and the Chinese model, bringing us back to state capitalism, and a topic far too broad for this blog post.

I started this post on US/PRC/AFRICA as a corollary to another piece on US drone policy in Africa and elsewhere. The United States has worked to expand economic ties with Africa beyond the trade that has been dominated by three African countries, Nigeria, Angola and South Africa. In the short-term, China has advantages in its ability to centrally direct the negotiation, direction, and scale of investment projects in Africa whereas the United States is limited in this regard, able to shape the environment for private investments more so than dictate such activities.  The activities that the U.S. Government does directly dictate are in the security sector, for example the counter-terrorism framework established through the CIA, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), and various combined joint task forces working with the African Union and African governments.

At this point, we're left with questions, the answers to which will determine much of what happens geopolitically for decades to come:

What mix of hard power and soft power brings the right results? What concerns about the people of Africa and the governments they live under should constrain positions in trade and investment negotiations? If an "African Spring" should emerge, how will this affect the outside powers and their interests? What are the long term consequences of the United States and a globalizing China competing for access  to natural resources? Will this turn into a competition for the political allegiances of African leaders?

DroneWars

Focusing the lens a bit tighter after the broad topics of the last blog, there are many options for analysis. One that stands out for the combination of strategic, operational and ethical questions it raises can be summed up with the word "drones."  Let's take them up each in turn, that is, the strategic, the operational, and the ethical.

In the two hours or so since I wrote that first paragraph, I became informed of a new development. On November 7th, the day after the U.S. presidential election, drone strikes killed al Qaeda operatives (names) in Yemen, X miles from the capital. Here is Bill Roggio from Long War Journal:

The strike was certainly carried out by the US-operated Predators or Reapers. US military and intelligence officials have repeatedly told The Long War Journal that the Yemeni air force does not have the ability to hit moving targets in a nighttime strike. And in early October, Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi admitted that the nighttime strikes were carried out by the US "because the Yemeni Air Force cannot carry out missions at night."

Adnan al Qadhi, an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula commander who operates in Sana'a, and two of his bodyguards, Rabiee Lahib and Radwan al Hashidi, were confirmed to have been killed in the strike, Yemeni officials said. Al Qadhi's family told Abdul Razzaq al Jamal, a Yemeni journalist who is closely linked to AQAP, that Qadhi and the two bodyguards were killed in the airstrike.

Al Qadhi is "a former jihadist fighter in Afghanistan and al Qaeda member" who is wanted for the Sept. 17, 2008 complex attack on the US Embassy in Sana'a, according to AFP. More than 16 people were killed after terrorists detonated multiple bombs and then launched a ground attack in an attempt to breach the compound. Al Qaeda also deployed snipers dressed in Yemeni military uniforms during the attack.

Last night's strike is the first recorded in Sana'a since the US stepped up air and missile attacks against terrorist operatives in 2009. The US is expanding its use of drones against AQAP in Yemen; prior strikes have focused on the network in southern Yemen. But the previous strike, on Oct. 28, took place in Saada in northern Yemen. Four AQAP fighters, including two Saudis, were killed in the attack that targeted a compound of a wanted al Qaeda commander."

Read more: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/11/us_drone_strike_near.php#ixzz2BqtheMAM 
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This could go a long way to explaining the timing of Gen. (ret.) Petraeus's exit from the CIA. I'll be posting more on the topic of drones over the weekend.
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a Reuters blog offers further insight and questions for thought; here's a snip:

So far, U.S. drone strikes appear to be keeping the Haqqanis under pressure, making it harder for the group – limited to a small number at the top – to travel, operate and communicate. Efforts to squeeze the Haqqanis’ business interests would complement this; but given the difficulty of the task, would not alone be a substitute. “The small and centralized nature of the decision-making process and fund distribution network could be a major vulnerability for the Haqqanis, suggesting the possibility that the killing or capture of key senior figures, in particular those who handle financial matters and supplies, might significantly degrade overall network capacity.”

So the question is really not whether drone strikes are right or wrong; or indeed in the interminable debates of exactly how many civilian casualties they cause (without free access to FATA we don’t know for sure; we know only that they have the precision capability to cause fewer  casualties than other weapons), but what are opponents of drones offering as an alternative?
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That last paragraph is provocative, but offers a false choice. We can discuss the rightness/wrongness of the policy while still searching for alternatives. One thing I assume is that it can't go on forever. Which brings up the strategic question -- how will we know when it's time to cut back or stop the drone attacks? Or is it a matter of shifting the bases geographically more so than ending the attacks, following the al Qaeda nodes as the network transforms further.

Post-Post Election Post

Having been swamped by too many freshman class papers to comprehend and a determination to avoid politics on Facebook, I also stepped away from blogging.  I want to thank Joe Cunningham for allowing me to share my bloggy thoughts on his site, and for his patience while I worked out my assessment of where the 2012 election is leading the United States in the realm of world affairs.

First, a recap of my thoughts on the two major party candidates per foreign policy questions.

• Because I believe the "real" Mitt Romney is "Moderate Mitt" and not "Severely Conservative Mitt," I always thought there were more similarities than differences in the world affairs views of the two candidates. This was proven during the debate on foreign policy in which Romney agreed with Obama's policies on a variety of substantive matters. The natural inclination in contemporary American politics seems to be to find fault with this, rather than take a positive view and find what can be built upon consensus.
• The issue that stood out for me per Romney was China. I feel quite strongly that, had he been elected, Mr. Romney would have spent Day Two of his administration explaining why he did not formally declare China to be a "currency manipulator" on Day One as he repeatedly promised. If this would have turned out to be inaccurate and the declaration issued, the effects would be both short-term (in the sovereign wealth and debt departments) and long-term (combining with ongoing and emerging areas of tension between China and the U.S. to make difficult the management of the most important international relationship for the 21st century. Romney).
• My view of the Obama Administration's management of U.S. foreign policy has been favorable, with strong positives far outweighing the complaints I hear. The Benghazi episode I liken to the 1982 attack on American Marines in Lebanon, an unfortunate event in a location of instability. However, unlike the history of Lebanon since 1982, the overall picture in Libya is encouraging, though with plenty to worry about as well.  The people's turn against the terrorists after the Benghazi attack proves (1) the Libyans are on our side against al Qaeda-related terrorist groups, and (2) they desire to take control and exercise responsibility over their own security challenges. By definition, unexpected crises can return with little specific warnings to dominate our attention, but the signs in Libya are more encouraging than they are discouraging.  Elsewhere, I agree that it is time for the Afghans and Iraqis to take responsibility for their own countries, ignoring for the moment that I don't really consider either to be a country, but highly fragile collections of people forced within common boundaries whose borders were drawn by outsiders with their own national interests to propagate.  The turnaround of Myanmar in both its foreign and domestic politics has been remarkable and significant as part of the administration's defense strategy of "pivoting" or "rebalancing" U.S. attention and resources toward Asia.  Because of the nature of Asian geopolitics, we learned long ago that multilateral alliance building does not work. Therefore, working bilaterally with Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, Australia and others, the administration has cultivated the beginnings of an effective military alliance network to counter the rise of China in the region. In the Persian Gulf, the Iranian-Israeli tensions are often highlighted at the expense of another factor, i.e., Iran's relations with its Arab neighbors, of which only Syria is on friendly terms and Syria is imploding with the help of its Persian, Turk and Arab neighbors. As covered in an earlier post here, the tensions between the United Arab Emirates and Iran are in increasingly heated over the islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunbs and Lesser Tunbs, located very near the Strait of Hormuz.  The U.S. has increased arms sales in the region, particularly in the area of missile defense with most going to Saudi Arabia and UAE.  Diplomatically, the Gulf Cooperation Council, which has never been more than a loosely organized collection of Gulf Arab states is still by no means as institutionalized as NATO or such long standing groups but is more cohesive and focused on a common problem than ever.  Many are facing domestic troubles and are presenting the West with a dilemma it's faced before, between supporting a strategically important ally and supporting the domestic opposition to the regime's policies and human rights records.  The situation in Bahrain, propped up by Saudi Arabia against a Shi'ite uprising, is a case in point.
• In sum, President Obama has practiced a pragmatic form of Realism or Realpolitik, aka power politics in which one cautiously determines policy based on considerations of power more so than of values such as democracy promotion.  His reputation as a Machiavellian political figure would also lend support to this characterization.  This is not to say concern for democracy and human rights is absent from the agenda, but as with the Realpolitik of Nixon/Kissinger, support for human rights is often a strategic move designed to enhance one's power position. From his early call for snipers to take out Somali pirates through his further advancement, by a large measure, of America's traditional disregard for the sovereignty of foreign states when the sovereignty or security of the United States is perceived to be at risk, Obama has demonstrated he is no idealist.  His policy toward Israel is classic Realism, for example following one of the great Hans "father of modern realism" Morgenthau's principles of international relations -- that big powers do not do the bidding of lesser powers. Obama may not have the best relationship with Prime Minister Netanyahu, but that may not be an entirely negative thing, and more importantly the relationship between the nations is much more than the relationship between specific governing officials at any given time.  And, finally, Obama's foreign policy has fully realized the importance of understanding new forms of warfare, including terrorism and cyberwar. We are witnessing hard fought but real successes in Somalia, Uganda, and Kenya, as well as progressing the effort against AQIM in Mali now that ECOWAS will be sending in stabilization forces.
• As stated (and used blatantly and proudly by the Obama team), Mr. Romney agreed with the general trajectory and sometimes specific policies of much of Obama's foreign policy. Which leaves the question as to why I would oppose Romney so strongly on foreign policy grounds.
1. Neo-Conservatism. The fact that Romney chose to seek the formal participation in his campaign by the likes of John Bolton was a giant red flag. The track record of these people is abysmal. They are blinded by ideology and do not get that the proper participation in global power politics is to know not only the extent but also the limits of one's power at any given time. More importantly their idealism regarding the ability of the United States to transplant democracy anywhere in the world regardless of local history and culture is dangerous, potentially leading us not into a possible limited, targeted strike on Iran, but a full blown invasion, occupation, regime change and democratization. Beware liberal imperialists is a byword with me. 
2. Great Power Politics. Romney did nothing to convince me to believe he understands the nuance required in relations with countries like China and Russia. The Russians did not follow the U.S. election very closely, reportedly because many felt that U.S.-Russian relations would not change with either candidate winning.  Frankly, I could not get a good read on Romney's strategic thinking about Russia, as I downplay the significance of gaffes from his campaign about the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia that made occasional headlines.  Romney's statement about Russia being America's #1 geopolitical foe is hardly enough to go on, though it raises valid questions about his judgment (and I'm one who found the statement not entirely unreasonable because, indeed, we do and will have geopolitical rivalries against the Russians). Obama also made numerous rookie mistakes, such as with the silly "reset" button presented to Putin.
   But, generally, American policy on Russia would be a bit ambiguous regardless of who is president, because either would have to deal with Putin's mercurial attitude, and with the fact that domestically Putin is facing a rising tide of trouble. The U.S. under Obama has worked effectively with the Central Asian states, who are determined to remain independent in spite of the American-Russian-Chinese rivalry for their allegiance and resources.  On China, as mentioned earlier, I never understand why candidates lock themselves into a self-spun web by pronouncing some bold action "on day one," whether it was to close Gitmo or to formally designate China a currency manipulator.  Regardless, to pronounce such a policy without conditions or stated support for diplomatic maneuvering prior to such a drastic step was not wise in my view. More generally regarding China, Romney seemed to think China's government would change its behavior simply because a President Romney would insist upon it. This shows a troubling idealism or delusion about how international relations work, especially between great powers.  Obama's pivot to Asia, while not without its resource constraints even as we exit Iraq and Afghanistan, has taken the form of about a half-dozen vital bilateral relationships that together form a network of allies countering Chinese claims to disputed territories and control of sea lanes. These type of issues are far too obscure (unfortunately) from the American public's view to be debated in our electoral campaigns, therefore we have to go by what we do hear, and, again, nothing I heard from the Romney camp convinced me he had the temperament, judgment and independent mind for leadership on this level.
3. Middle Powers....There was little mention of Brazil or India, so honestly here I'm talking mostly about Israel again. I oppose many Israeli policies but I also understand their position and have no problem with the U.S. allying with Israel. But it seems to me many people have skewed ideas about how international alliances work. There is too much analogizing to personal relationships, constantly referring to the Israelis as friends rather than allies (and there never seems to be any question of how Israel treats the United States, only the other way around).  Also, as I mentioned earlier, there is apparent confusion as to how superpowers are to conduct themselves in relations with lesser powers. I am not recommending a policy of disdain or condescension, but I am saying that American policy must be based on American interests, and Israel has a separate set of concerns than we do as a global power. I fear that many of the conservative movement allow themselves to go too far in support of Israel, treating Israel as an extension of the United States (or the other way around, even), and advocating a scenario wherein the U.S. follows Israel's lead rather than the other way around. We can replace the name Israel with any other mid-level power in the world and my opinion would be the same -- the bigger player calls the shots. I also do not associate myself with the religiously-driven agenda of some American supporters of Israel, but I have little doubt they would have had greater influence in a Romney administration than in the Obama administration, and I do not find that to be a proper basis for policy. Then there's the oddity of Sherman Adelson, whose agenda for supporting first Gingrich and then Romney included the liberation of Jonathan Pollard from U.S. prison. That's all I needed to know.
4. Terrorism. Here Mr. Romney offered much agreement with the course of actions taken by President Obama, which does little to recommend the need for replacing the incumbent. The progress we've made in Africa -- not completed but definitely progress has been made -- is exemplary of Obama's strategy of using Special Ops Forces and drone technology rather than sledge hammer invasions.
5. To conclude, anyone who is and will be President of the United States for some time to come will be faced with enormous and multi-faceted challenges. I appreciate the Realism-based approach of the Obama administration, which is not to say there no downsides or that all has been perfect. Far from it. But it's a philosophy I find most compelling and productive of international stability. I don't argue that a Romney foreign policy would have been disastrous; indeed, it's apparent many current policies would continue. This is actually more the norm than otherwise, but people seem to have a need to believe that EVERYTHING changes when administrations change, particularly when one party replaces the other in the White House.  Yet there is always a great deal of continuity. In the end, I could not find compelling reasons to support Romney, or to change from the course we are on under Obama onto a Romney course that involves influences I find questionable for American interests and many questions about Romney's own stated positions.

Once again the Jamestown Foundation gives us valuable insight, in this case with a brief but informative study of how the U.S. Presidential election is being covered in China.  See here for article.