Imperialism: The Highest Form of State Capitalism?

Regarding Africa, I expect two things between the US and China. Right now China is investing $$$ in Africa but trying to avoid military entanglements (same for China in Middle East). The US is investing in mostly military alliances (not in the NATO sense but more like fluid, short-term and shifting alliances) that's working very well against al-Shabab in Somalia. We're engaging in some "capacity building" as well (water, clinics, etc) but I expect that we'll have to advance investment in bigger projects and China will find itself drawn into local conflicts to protect its interests.

The title of this post is taken from Vladimir's Lenin's famous treatise, "Imperialism: The Highest Form of Capitalism," in which he offers the Bolshevik perspective on WW I. It's often compared with John Hobson's work on empire, also from the early 20th century.  State Capitalism is a characterization of the Chinese business model. The name is self-explanatory, the question is whether it is sustainable against global free market forces and domestic turmoil should the model begin to lag in implementation. 

Here is a very useful map of Africa illustrating Chinese investments on the continent. The map was published in August 2012 in Business Insider.

In this online publication from Zimbabwe, issue is taken with a recent book that praised China as an investment partner for Africa. It's an illustrative case of the broader, global puzzle into which this debate fits. This portion is telling:

China’s opaque business dealings with dictatorships reveal that it is not interested in the development of the country and communities where it operates from, hence it pays little regard to business ethics, transparency and accountability.

While the Chinese played an important role in the decolonisation process on the African continent, and Zimbabwe in particular, I’m afraid its involvement in the country now is retrogressive as it is only concerned with extraction, not development. While failing to promote development in Africa, China has however successfully helped to prop up repressive regimes which are mortgaging their resources to it.
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It's difficult to not observe China's behavior and not associate it with long-standing notions of neo-imperialism.  The goal is wholly material and not in the least social:  deals are made for the extraction of vital natural resources, with socio-political concerns not part of the equation. Even assuming China remains disengaged from direct involvement in political and military affairs in Zimbabwe and elsewhere, there are consequences to not acting and there are consequences to the development that is taking place. The Zimbabwean quoted above notwithstanding, consider the long-term effects of China's investments in universities.  First, there is the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.  Just on the opening page of FOCAC's webpage are a few new headlines that exemplify where I'm going with this:

Congo borrowing $1.1 billion USD from China
Chinese firms set up railway technology training center in Nigeria
Africa becomes largest Chinese medicine export market

At this past summer's FOCAC meeting, President Hu Jintao himself announced new levels of Chinese support for training and education in Africa, as summarized here (quoted below); the full text of the speech is here


“China will implement the African Talents Programme to train 30,000 personnel in various sectors, offer 18,000 government scholarships and build cultural and vocational training facilities....China will continue to implement the China-Africa Joint Research and Exchange Plan to sponsor 100 programmes for research, exchange and cooperation by academic institutions and scholars of the two sides."

“China and Africa should increase cultural and people-to-people exchanges and encourage exchanges and interactions between the two sides in education, culture, science and technology, health, sports and tourism.”

Hu Jintao said China had trained close to 40,000 Africans in various sectors and provided more than 20,000 government scholarships to people in African countries.

“China and Africa have set up 29 Confucius Institutes in 22 African countries. Twenty pairs of leading Chinese and African universities have entered into cooperation under the 20+20 Cooperation Plan for Chinese and African Institutions of Higher Education,” he added.

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Have a look at the Confucius Institutes referenced above here.

These exercises in soft power will not necessarily spare China from entanglement in African political affairs. As China is learning at home, education, skills, and jobs lead to public expectations that these qualities of life will continue, and that they will pay off benefits beyond the family throughout civil society. Evolving public expectations often challenge the prevailing social order; we can look to the Arab Spring and to the 100,000 annual protests in China itself for ideas of what can come next.

More immediately, even the extent of contact China has established in Africa has brought out tensions, which the United States sees as opportunities. Some examples are cited in this Christian Science Monitor article covering Secretary Clinton's August trip to Africa this past August.

This report by the Congressional Research Service from June, 2012, contains much useful information.  A textbox within the report contains this summary:

Comparing Chinese and U.S. Trade with Africa

The value of total trade between China and Africa stood at $8.9 billion in the year 2000. In 2009, Chinese-African trade, totaling $70.4 billion, surpassed that of U.S.-Africa trade ($62 billion), and reached $127.3 billion in 2011, an increase of 1,423% over the 2000 level.25 Africa’s share of global Chinese trade also grew over the past decade, from 1.9% of Chinese global trade in 2000 to 3.5% of China’s global trade in 2011. China is also Africa’s largest single source of imports, while the United States is its largest export destination. In 2011, about 62% of African exports to China consisted of crude oil (over $24.77 billion of which came from Angola, the source of over 9% of China’s oil imports in 2011). Another 34% was made up of raw materials, mostly metal commodities and wood. Oil also dominates Africa’s exports to the United States; crude oil made up about 75% of U.S. imports from Africa in 2011. Both China and the United States export a highly diverse, variable array of products to Africa, notably equipment, machinery, vehicles, and other technology. U.S.-African trade has also grown over the past decade, but not as rapidly as Sino-African trade.
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It's a rather remarkable stat -- 1,423% in 11 years. The as yet unsaid factor in this neo-colonial race through Africa is the difference between the American model of foreign direct investment and the Chinese model, bringing us back to state capitalism, and a topic far too broad for this blog post.

I started this post on US/PRC/AFRICA as a corollary to another piece on US drone policy in Africa and elsewhere. The United States has worked to expand economic ties with Africa beyond the trade that has been dominated by three African countries, Nigeria, Angola and South Africa. In the short-term, China has advantages in its ability to centrally direct the negotiation, direction, and scale of investment projects in Africa whereas the United States is limited in this regard, able to shape the environment for private investments more so than dictate such activities.  The activities that the U.S. Government does directly dictate are in the security sector, for example the counter-terrorism framework established through the CIA, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), and various combined joint task forces working with the African Union and African governments.

At this point, we're left with questions, the answers to which will determine much of what happens geopolitically for decades to come:

What mix of hard power and soft power brings the right results? What concerns about the people of Africa and the governments they live under should constrain positions in trade and investment negotiations? If an "African Spring" should emerge, how will this affect the outside powers and their interests? What are the long term consequences of the United States and a globalizing China competing for access  to natural resources? Will this turn into a competition for the political allegiances of African leaders?

DroneWars

Focusing the lens a bit tighter after the broad topics of the last blog, there are many options for analysis. One that stands out for the combination of strategic, operational and ethical questions it raises can be summed up with the word "drones."  Let's take them up each in turn, that is, the strategic, the operational, and the ethical.

In the two hours or so since I wrote that first paragraph, I became informed of a new development. On November 7th, the day after the U.S. presidential election, drone strikes killed al Qaeda operatives (names) in Yemen, X miles from the capital. Here is Bill Roggio from Long War Journal:

The strike was certainly carried out by the US-operated Predators or Reapers. US military and intelligence officials have repeatedly told The Long War Journal that the Yemeni air force does not have the ability to hit moving targets in a nighttime strike. And in early October, Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi admitted that the nighttime strikes were carried out by the US "because the Yemeni Air Force cannot carry out missions at night."

Adnan al Qadhi, an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula commander who operates in Sana'a, and two of his bodyguards, Rabiee Lahib and Radwan al Hashidi, were confirmed to have been killed in the strike, Yemeni officials said. Al Qadhi's family told Abdul Razzaq al Jamal, a Yemeni journalist who is closely linked to AQAP, that Qadhi and the two bodyguards were killed in the airstrike.

Al Qadhi is "a former jihadist fighter in Afghanistan and al Qaeda member" who is wanted for the Sept. 17, 2008 complex attack on the US Embassy in Sana'a, according to AFP. More than 16 people were killed after terrorists detonated multiple bombs and then launched a ground attack in an attempt to breach the compound. Al Qaeda also deployed snipers dressed in Yemeni military uniforms during the attack.

Last night's strike is the first recorded in Sana'a since the US stepped up air and missile attacks against terrorist operatives in 2009. The US is expanding its use of drones against AQAP in Yemen; prior strikes have focused on the network in southern Yemen. But the previous strike, on Oct. 28, took place in Saada in northern Yemen. Four AQAP fighters, including two Saudis, were killed in the attack that targeted a compound of a wanted al Qaeda commander."

Read more: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/11/us_drone_strike_near.php#ixzz2BqtheMAM 
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This could go a long way to explaining the timing of Gen. (ret.) Petraeus's exit from the CIA. I'll be posting more on the topic of drones over the weekend.
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a Reuters blog offers further insight and questions for thought; here's a snip:

So far, U.S. drone strikes appear to be keeping the Haqqanis under pressure, making it harder for the group – limited to a small number at the top – to travel, operate and communicate. Efforts to squeeze the Haqqanis’ business interests would complement this; but given the difficulty of the task, would not alone be a substitute. “The small and centralized nature of the decision-making process and fund distribution network could be a major vulnerability for the Haqqanis, suggesting the possibility that the killing or capture of key senior figures, in particular those who handle financial matters and supplies, might significantly degrade overall network capacity.”

So the question is really not whether drone strikes are right or wrong; or indeed in the interminable debates of exactly how many civilian casualties they cause (without free access to FATA we don’t know for sure; we know only that they have the precision capability to cause fewer  casualties than other weapons), but what are opponents of drones offering as an alternative?
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That last paragraph is provocative, but offers a false choice. We can discuss the rightness/wrongness of the policy while still searching for alternatives. One thing I assume is that it can't go on forever. Which brings up the strategic question -- how will we know when it's time to cut back or stop the drone attacks? Or is it a matter of shifting the bases geographically more so than ending the attacks, following the al Qaeda nodes as the network transforms further.

Post-Post Election Post

Having been swamped by too many freshman class papers to comprehend and a determination to avoid politics on Facebook, I also stepped away from blogging.  I want to thank Joe Cunningham for allowing me to share my bloggy thoughts on his site, and for his patience while I worked out my assessment of where the 2012 election is leading the United States in the realm of world affairs.

First, a recap of my thoughts on the two major party candidates per foreign policy questions.

• Because I believe the "real" Mitt Romney is "Moderate Mitt" and not "Severely Conservative Mitt," I always thought there were more similarities than differences in the world affairs views of the two candidates. This was proven during the debate on foreign policy in which Romney agreed with Obama's policies on a variety of substantive matters. The natural inclination in contemporary American politics seems to be to find fault with this, rather than take a positive view and find what can be built upon consensus.
• The issue that stood out for me per Romney was China. I feel quite strongly that, had he been elected, Mr. Romney would have spent Day Two of his administration explaining why he did not formally declare China to be a "currency manipulator" on Day One as he repeatedly promised. If this would have turned out to be inaccurate and the declaration issued, the effects would be both short-term (in the sovereign wealth and debt departments) and long-term (combining with ongoing and emerging areas of tension between China and the U.S. to make difficult the management of the most important international relationship for the 21st century. Romney).
• My view of the Obama Administration's management of U.S. foreign policy has been favorable, with strong positives far outweighing the complaints I hear. The Benghazi episode I liken to the 1982 attack on American Marines in Lebanon, an unfortunate event in a location of instability. However, unlike the history of Lebanon since 1982, the overall picture in Libya is encouraging, though with plenty to worry about as well.  The people's turn against the terrorists after the Benghazi attack proves (1) the Libyans are on our side against al Qaeda-related terrorist groups, and (2) they desire to take control and exercise responsibility over their own security challenges. By definition, unexpected crises can return with little specific warnings to dominate our attention, but the signs in Libya are more encouraging than they are discouraging.  Elsewhere, I agree that it is time for the Afghans and Iraqis to take responsibility for their own countries, ignoring for the moment that I don't really consider either to be a country, but highly fragile collections of people forced within common boundaries whose borders were drawn by outsiders with their own national interests to propagate.  The turnaround of Myanmar in both its foreign and domestic politics has been remarkable and significant as part of the administration's defense strategy of "pivoting" or "rebalancing" U.S. attention and resources toward Asia.  Because of the nature of Asian geopolitics, we learned long ago that multilateral alliance building does not work. Therefore, working bilaterally with Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, Australia and others, the administration has cultivated the beginnings of an effective military alliance network to counter the rise of China in the region. In the Persian Gulf, the Iranian-Israeli tensions are often highlighted at the expense of another factor, i.e., Iran's relations with its Arab neighbors, of which only Syria is on friendly terms and Syria is imploding with the help of its Persian, Turk and Arab neighbors. As covered in an earlier post here, the tensions between the United Arab Emirates and Iran are in increasingly heated over the islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunbs and Lesser Tunbs, located very near the Strait of Hormuz.  The U.S. has increased arms sales in the region, particularly in the area of missile defense with most going to Saudi Arabia and UAE.  Diplomatically, the Gulf Cooperation Council, which has never been more than a loosely organized collection of Gulf Arab states is still by no means as institutionalized as NATO or such long standing groups but is more cohesive and focused on a common problem than ever.  Many are facing domestic troubles and are presenting the West with a dilemma it's faced before, between supporting a strategically important ally and supporting the domestic opposition to the regime's policies and human rights records.  The situation in Bahrain, propped up by Saudi Arabia against a Shi'ite uprising, is a case in point.
• In sum, President Obama has practiced a pragmatic form of Realism or Realpolitik, aka power politics in which one cautiously determines policy based on considerations of power more so than of values such as democracy promotion.  His reputation as a Machiavellian political figure would also lend support to this characterization.  This is not to say concern for democracy and human rights is absent from the agenda, but as with the Realpolitik of Nixon/Kissinger, support for human rights is often a strategic move designed to enhance one's power position. From his early call for snipers to take out Somali pirates through his further advancement, by a large measure, of America's traditional disregard for the sovereignty of foreign states when the sovereignty or security of the United States is perceived to be at risk, Obama has demonstrated he is no idealist.  His policy toward Israel is classic Realism, for example following one of the great Hans "father of modern realism" Morgenthau's principles of international relations -- that big powers do not do the bidding of lesser powers. Obama may not have the best relationship with Prime Minister Netanyahu, but that may not be an entirely negative thing, and more importantly the relationship between the nations is much more than the relationship between specific governing officials at any given time.  And, finally, Obama's foreign policy has fully realized the importance of understanding new forms of warfare, including terrorism and cyberwar. We are witnessing hard fought but real successes in Somalia, Uganda, and Kenya, as well as progressing the effort against AQIM in Mali now that ECOWAS will be sending in stabilization forces.
• As stated (and used blatantly and proudly by the Obama team), Mr. Romney agreed with the general trajectory and sometimes specific policies of much of Obama's foreign policy. Which leaves the question as to why I would oppose Romney so strongly on foreign policy grounds.
1. Neo-Conservatism. The fact that Romney chose to seek the formal participation in his campaign by the likes of John Bolton was a giant red flag. The track record of these people is abysmal. They are blinded by ideology and do not get that the proper participation in global power politics is to know not only the extent but also the limits of one's power at any given time. More importantly their idealism regarding the ability of the United States to transplant democracy anywhere in the world regardless of local history and culture is dangerous, potentially leading us not into a possible limited, targeted strike on Iran, but a full blown invasion, occupation, regime change and democratization. Beware liberal imperialists is a byword with me. 
2. Great Power Politics. Romney did nothing to convince me to believe he understands the nuance required in relations with countries like China and Russia. The Russians did not follow the U.S. election very closely, reportedly because many felt that U.S.-Russian relations would not change with either candidate winning.  Frankly, I could not get a good read on Romney's strategic thinking about Russia, as I downplay the significance of gaffes from his campaign about the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia that made occasional headlines.  Romney's statement about Russia being America's #1 geopolitical foe is hardly enough to go on, though it raises valid questions about his judgment (and I'm one who found the statement not entirely unreasonable because, indeed, we do and will have geopolitical rivalries against the Russians). Obama also made numerous rookie mistakes, such as with the silly "reset" button presented to Putin.
   But, generally, American policy on Russia would be a bit ambiguous regardless of who is president, because either would have to deal with Putin's mercurial attitude, and with the fact that domestically Putin is facing a rising tide of trouble. The U.S. under Obama has worked effectively with the Central Asian states, who are determined to remain independent in spite of the American-Russian-Chinese rivalry for their allegiance and resources.  On China, as mentioned earlier, I never understand why candidates lock themselves into a self-spun web by pronouncing some bold action "on day one," whether it was to close Gitmo or to formally designate China a currency manipulator.  Regardless, to pronounce such a policy without conditions or stated support for diplomatic maneuvering prior to such a drastic step was not wise in my view. More generally regarding China, Romney seemed to think China's government would change its behavior simply because a President Romney would insist upon it. This shows a troubling idealism or delusion about how international relations work, especially between great powers.  Obama's pivot to Asia, while not without its resource constraints even as we exit Iraq and Afghanistan, has taken the form of about a half-dozen vital bilateral relationships that together form a network of allies countering Chinese claims to disputed territories and control of sea lanes. These type of issues are far too obscure (unfortunately) from the American public's view to be debated in our electoral campaigns, therefore we have to go by what we do hear, and, again, nothing I heard from the Romney camp convinced me he had the temperament, judgment and independent mind for leadership on this level.
3. Middle Powers....There was little mention of Brazil or India, so honestly here I'm talking mostly about Israel again. I oppose many Israeli policies but I also understand their position and have no problem with the U.S. allying with Israel. But it seems to me many people have skewed ideas about how international alliances work. There is too much analogizing to personal relationships, constantly referring to the Israelis as friends rather than allies (and there never seems to be any question of how Israel treats the United States, only the other way around).  Also, as I mentioned earlier, there is apparent confusion as to how superpowers are to conduct themselves in relations with lesser powers. I am not recommending a policy of disdain or condescension, but I am saying that American policy must be based on American interests, and Israel has a separate set of concerns than we do as a global power. I fear that many of the conservative movement allow themselves to go too far in support of Israel, treating Israel as an extension of the United States (or the other way around, even), and advocating a scenario wherein the U.S. follows Israel's lead rather than the other way around. We can replace the name Israel with any other mid-level power in the world and my opinion would be the same -- the bigger player calls the shots. I also do not associate myself with the religiously-driven agenda of some American supporters of Israel, but I have little doubt they would have had greater influence in a Romney administration than in the Obama administration, and I do not find that to be a proper basis for policy. Then there's the oddity of Sherman Adelson, whose agenda for supporting first Gingrich and then Romney included the liberation of Jonathan Pollard from U.S. prison. That's all I needed to know.
4. Terrorism. Here Mr. Romney offered much agreement with the course of actions taken by President Obama, which does little to recommend the need for replacing the incumbent. The progress we've made in Africa -- not completed but definitely progress has been made -- is exemplary of Obama's strategy of using Special Ops Forces and drone technology rather than sledge hammer invasions.
5. To conclude, anyone who is and will be President of the United States for some time to come will be faced with enormous and multi-faceted challenges. I appreciate the Realism-based approach of the Obama administration, which is not to say there no downsides or that all has been perfect. Far from it. But it's a philosophy I find most compelling and productive of international stability. I don't argue that a Romney foreign policy would have been disastrous; indeed, it's apparent many current policies would continue. This is actually more the norm than otherwise, but people seem to have a need to believe that EVERYTHING changes when administrations change, particularly when one party replaces the other in the White House.  Yet there is always a great deal of continuity. In the end, I could not find compelling reasons to support Romney, or to change from the course we are on under Obama onto a Romney course that involves influences I find questionable for American interests and many questions about Romney's own stated positions.

Once again the Jamestown Foundation gives us valuable insight, in this case with a brief but informative study of how the U.S. Presidential election is being covered in China.  See here for article.

Libya & the U.S. - An Opportunistic History and a Historic Opportunity

It is always interesting to see the historical analogies brought forth by politicians and pundits. This week it's been 1979, and not without good cause. That was the last time a U.S. Ambassador was murdered on the job, and of course after President Carter allowed the exiled Shah of Iran into the United States, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was taken over by revolutionaries backed by the new sovereign government, who then held U.S. diplomats hostage for well over a year.  Carter had resisted granting permission for some time in spite of constant pressure from Henry Kissinger, David Rockefeller, John McCloy, Zbigniew Brzezinski and their acolytes. In the end, as the Shah's diagnosis was suspected to be cancer, the President relented and granted entry. A good retelling of the story by one of those taken hostage in Tehran can be found in the online journal American Diplomacy.

The Carter administration's late and failed attempt to rescue the hostage through limited military action was a strong blow against America's global reputation, and helped to seal his defeat in the subsequent election. His opponent, Ronald Reagan, was uncritical of the president after the failed hostage rescue attempt and called for national unity.  Now, the analogies between 1979 and this past week's events in Egypt and Libya have been repeated often (suspending for rhetoric's sake the far reaching differences between the situations in Egypt and Libya).  There are Islamists, an embassy, and a Democrat U.S. president.  For now I will focus on Libya.

I would like to offer an alternative historical analysis, all the while emphasizing that no political analogies are a perfect match to the situations to which they are being compared.  The 1979 takeover of the embassy in Iran did have a specific aspect in common with the 2012 Libyan strike on the U.S. embassy -- both appear to be in direct response to U.S. actions.  In 1979, it was the permission granted for the Shah to enter the United States.  In 2012, there is talk of the Libyan strike being in retaliation for the killing of a top al Qaeda figure, a Libyan, by the United States.  One might be tempted to add the revolutionary contexts in the two countries as another point of commonality. However, the Iranian takeover the embassy was a part of the revolution. In Libya, the United States enjoys widespread support among the Libyan people who, in post-revolution elections, elected a non-Islamist government that is aiding the United States in investigating the attack. It was a strike against the revolution by globalized terrorists, not a part of the revolution.  The situation in Egypt is far less settled even than in Libya. In Egypt, I am not convinced the revolution is over, and this week's events is evidence.  As I said in my previous post, there are many as yet unanswered questions, and I hope we find answers and learn the right lessons.

The politics of the American presidential election have unsurprisingly entered the scene, as each side attempts to frame the questions and control the messages facing the voting public.  The incumbent president has a great deal to answer for, given the confidence with which he planned to help stabilize this volatile region, and his actions over the coming weeks and months will have some impact on the election. The details will determine to what degree this impact is felt. The Romney campaign is trying to paint the Obama administration as weak and misguided, though I have not heard the alternative strategies the Obama administration should have taken.  Should he have protected Ghadafi and Mubarak?  What about the argument that was floated publicly by some conservatives, declaring the Arab Spring a vindication of, or even a result of, President George W. Bush's "freedom agenda"? But in the past 24 hours Gov. Sarah Palin was on television saying that the promotion of democracy in the Middle East and North African regions is an unrealistic proposition.  Conservative talk show host Sean Hannity and Sen. John McCain had a tense discussion in which McCain accurately depicted the situation in Libya while Hannity seemed unable to tell the difference between Egypt and Libya.  So, while important details are needed to answer specific questions about intelligence and embassy security, as a political issue I only seem to get confused as to what it is the president's critics offer as an alternative plan, or even a cogent criticism.

Let's take a look at timeline of instances, rather than just one, extending our perspective from a single historical analogy (the 1979 Iranian revolution) to a chronology of events that, because of Iran's support for Hezbollah, can be seen to be an extension of the Iranian revolution as well as the early developments of the global Islamist terrorism we still face today.  Much importance has often been assigned to the fact that in spite of an agreement to release them earlier, the American hostages were not released by the Iranian revolutionaries until after President Reagan had taken the oath of office.  There will always be debate about the reasons behind these developments, but ultimately it's not a very important point.  What is significant is that Islamist terrorism continued, even accelerated and expanded, over the years following the Iranian revolution, and it's my thesis that we benefit from realizing the historical similarities or connections between the developments of the 1980s and today, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).  First, an abridged summary --

1981 Libyan Air Force learns lesson from challenging USAF

June 1982 Israel invades Lebanon, bombing Beirut

                SecState Haig and then Shulz want US involved in peace process

                SecDef Weinberger and JCS do not want to deploy troops

                Reagan finds middle ground, sends 800 Marines in August 1982

                                PLO fighters leave, U.S. troops withdrawn

                

 September 1982  700 refugees killed by militia with close ties to Israel

                                  US troops ordered back on shore

April 1983 Hezbollah truck bombs US Embassy Beirut, 17 Americans killed, including 8 CIA

                  Attacks continue. Reagan orders shelling of militia camps

October 23, 1983 Marine barracks at Beirut airport bombed – 241 servicemen killed, mostly               Marines.    Over 100 wounded.  More US shelling in response. Baker, Weinberger and JCS want troops removed.

December 12, 1983 US Embassy in Kuwait bombed, 6 killed, 80 injured

February 1984 remaining troops removed from Beirut

Libyan international terrorism continues 1985-6 in Rome, Vienna, Berlin; Reagan drops 60 tons of bombs on Tripoli, Qaddafi lives and two days later 3 U.S. employees of the American University in Beirut are murdered for the state purpose of revenge for the attack on Tripoli. (The history.com link in the preceding sentence is from 1986, just linked for a quick summary. It includes the often reported death of Qaddafi's 15 month old adopted daughter as a result of the American raid. During the 2011 revolution, it was revealed that the now-grown woman was not killed and was never formally adopted by the long time dictator).

1988 Pan Am 103 bombed over Lockerbie, killing 270, including 189 Americans. Qaddafi stayed in power until 2011.

A more global look at acts of terrorism and war from 1979 to 1988 can be found here.

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So where do we go with this?  Thousands of Libyans fought against us and for al Qaeda in Iraq, and since then many have moved on to Syria and are contributing to the overthrow of Assad with who knows what to come after he's gone.  After losing the revolution at home, a reported 12,000 Libyan fighters carried their weapons to Mali, a country that has seen rising expectations dashed hard on the rocks of tribal and religious warfare.  For decades the Libyan people have suffered under the cloud of the terrorism-sponsoring Qaddafi and now find their homeland and young men subject to non-state terrorism recruitment and a country flooded with arms. 

Where we go is to continue assessing U.S. geopolitical interests in Libya. I believe we are still looking at a historic opportunity to both stabilize Libya, thereby protecting the energy infrastructure and squeezing out another cell of al Qaeda, as well as to assist an incipient democracy take hold. As a principal stakeholder in the geopolitics of the Middle East and North Africa for over fifty years, the United States has inevitably been dragged into the tribal, sectarian, and political-economic struggles of the region.  The targeting of U.S. embassies is not a recently invented tactic, as the abridged summary above illustrates, and I'm only writing about the MENA region, whereas there were attacks on U.S. installations in Europe and Latin America as well.  It's part of being a global power. President Reagan is widely praised for taking action against Libya, but those doing the praising also claim that the bombing of Tripoli silenced Qaddafi, taking Libya out of the terrorist picture. The historical evidence shows otherwise, particularly the 189 Americans killed on Pam Am 103.  Furthermore, throughout the 1980s just as today the Libyan situation has dual qualities: in many ways it stands apart, for example, the current differences between Libya and Egypt, but has also been part and parcel of the broader MENA geopolitical environment. In the 1980s, Americans were killed in Beirut in retaliation for the American bombing of Tripoli.  The US embassies in Beirut and in Kuwait were attacked, and for all of its sincere support of Israel, President Reagan issued harsh words and demands against Prime Minister Begin as Israel's invasion of Lebanon was conducted with a fury that mocked the laws of war.  Reagan's cabinet was heavily divided on the right course of action.  The same dilemmas would plague all subsequent administrations, and will plague the administrations of the near future as well, regardless of partisan control of the White House and of debates over defense spending.

President Obama's handling of the current situation can affect the upcoming election, or at least will be on the minds of his political handlers, just as previous political handlers worried about the effects of policy on voters' decisions.  We all hope stability can be restored without mass destruction. But regardless of the electoral outcome in November, the Commander-in-Chief will have to manage these affairs under conditions we cannot wholly control.

I repeat a theme from my last post: The U.S. government cannot determine which groups will rise and which will fail in foreign cultures, though as in Libya the U.S. can be an important factor in shaping the outcomes.

North Africa -- Chaos and Consequences

Let us not forget that the fundamental theory of chaos is one of consequences -- the butterfly effect, as is often cited.  Slight variations in initial conditions lead to widely varying and non-linear effects over time. The introduction of chaos theory (and in particular deterministic chaos theory) into social sciences has had mixed results, as succinctly summarized here. Its application to policy making is difficult as well, because unlike in its use in mathematics and physical sciences, chaos theory cannot specify which initial social-political condition will have precisely what effects. However, ultimately chaos theory is about the search for order and provides us with a general path along which we can focus our attention on finding order within disorder and on tracing the multiple and non-linear strands of causes and effects.

So let's look at Egypt and the events of the past few days. We need more answers. Many many more answers. I finally succumbed and signed up for a Twitter account (@GrangerGreg). My first tweet was an expression of condolence for the family of our slain foreign service officers and military support staff.  My second was a reply in the form of a question to the State Department, which is putting out multiple tweets denying any validity or justification for the violence in both Egypt and Libya.  My question was based on what I have to call rumors as I cannot independently confirm; it has been alleged that the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Anne Patterson, forbade Marines whose duty it is to protect the Embassy from carrying live ammunition.  I want to reiterate that this has been mentioned and repeated in a few online blogs, and that repeating an allegation does not make it true. If it is true, the Ambassador should be recalled to Washington and possibly removed from her position.  There are other factors that are beyond the Ambassador's control -- such as a Diplomatic Security Service that is stretched too thin and long-standing disagreements between security personnel and State public affairs officers over the need for and images created by high levels of security. And of course direct responsibility for any insecurity, damage, and loss of life belongs to the perpetrators, be they religious fanatics, football hooligans or willingly manipulated unemployed youths, as seems to be the composition of the Egyptian protestors.  But if the no-live-ammo allegation is true, and especially if it can be shown that this directly constrained the ability to protect the Embassy and its personnel in Cairo, then there must be accountability. The effects of one policy change, regardless of intent, are potentially very strongly felt, particularly in the context of a country in revolution.

More broadly, there are serious questions about the Egyptian government that require answers. The history of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has clearly not prepared the group for governance, and yet this is the most highly organized body in Egyptian civil society so all others would likely be even worse.  The problem as I see it, however, is that stable governance that respects human rights in Egypt is entirely possible, but only through pragmatism.  The elected government in power, however, cannot find the appropriate balance between ideology and practicality -- and unfortunately it seems to be the ideological side of the equation that's dominant.

There are calls for cutting off U.S. aid to Egypt, and I understand the sentiment. I would caution, first, against conflating Libya and Egypt. It appears that the Libyan government is helping the United States and the vast majority of Libyans want to be on the side of the United States. Focusing on Egypt, the answer may not be to simply cut off all aid. We need more information about the military side of Egypt's government. We know that the military has taken action against Islamist militants in the Sinai -- and that the President reacted by firing the military leadership. The United States has faced similar dilemmas before: We preach democracy, including civilian governance and respect for human rights, however, we have often sided with military juntas, elevating stability over democracy. It's Realpolitik, and should always be controversial, even if taking such an amoral stance leads to the right outcomes. In the age of instant communications and global media, what is different from the past is that should we adopt the Egyptian military as our principal client and support an advancement of their role in decision-making and governance, and then there arises news of military abuses of civil society, the blowback could be tremendous in a country of 80 million. The Egyptian populace's view of the United States seems to be a far cry from that of the Libyans' affection for Americans.  In a phone call with President Morsi yesterday, President Obama was told that the U.S. Embassy will receive necessary security cooperation.  There is much room for skepticism. If the elected government does not stabilize the situation, there is increased likelihood that the military will attempt to do so. The decision of the United States to support one or the other could make the difference and improve the situation, but in any case there will be unintended consequences to manage and attempts at blowback to rollback, possibly with force -- and another air war is unlikely to do the trick.

I have defended President Obama's method of waging war against al Qaeda.  The terrorist organization has transformed significantly into a network of proliferating organizations and in many cases into leaderless small group or single-individual operations.  I have ongoing research into how the idea of chaoplexic warfare, which combines elements of chaos theory and complexity science, is useful in understanding these developments.  The president's heightened reliance on drone warfare, Special Operations Forces, and local anti-jihadist fighters in Africa is the right mix, though success is difficult to measure and many challenges persist.  The fact that groups such as AQIM, AQAP, al-Shabab that represented the key nodes in a growing networked al Qaeda, are themselves unable to effectively control offshoots from their organizations illustrates that the terrorist group will continue to change and that U.S. policies are contributing to this instability by continually assaulting any attempt at terrorist leadership.  I also do not have high expectations for this or any other U.S. president when it comes to controlling events in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere. The vague demands for "American leadership" in these situations fall flat when one tries to figure out just what that means.  These are not our revolutions, though they do hold repercussions for our interests. But the notion that President Obama (or President Romney) can somehow exercise leadership over foreign populations in a time of revolution is absurd, and many informed commentaries on Egypt suggest that the Egyptian tendency toward conspiracy theories makes it even less likely that this nation in chaos will see any reason to follow the leadership of an outsider (when they can't even figure out leadership in country). This does not mean the United States cannot shape some events, and we can certainly create conditions that offer incentives and disincentives for Egyptians to consider -- the threat to financial assistance and the arrival of U.S. warships and Marines are good examples. If Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood can cooperate internationally, can convince at least the less fanatical protestors that their concerns will be addressed, and can work with its military to marginalize religious fanatics, we could see a quietening over the next week or so.  If not, we will either see larger and more violent protests and/or a larger and more aggressive military stabilization policy.  The United States cannot deterministically engineer the outcomes, but with the right mix of initial conditions, we can increase the probability of favorable outcomes.

I have not received a reply to my State Department tweet.

Links to Helpful Graphs on Consumer Finances and Gas Prices

Handy blogs with helpful graphs. Dig around each site for additional data.

First, on financial issues :

From the American Bankruptcy Institute, a collection of great charts on a variety of consumer finance issues: Chart of the Day

I had heard mention of the Calculated Risk Blog but just getting around to  looking it over. For example, see this new piece on recent trends in consumer debt -- good news in the debt management department:

See: Calculated Risk Blog

Here is the CRBlog's Graph Gallery

Switching gears, here is an interactive chart that allows us to compare gas prices nationally and across cities, states, and times.  See Historical Gas Prices page.

U.S. Leadership of International Military Exercises -- Preparing for Proxy Wars?

This post is structured around a recent Nick Turse article published in Asia Times, Tomdispatch, and other sites. My contribution is to supply videos and other documentation related to many of the military exercises covered.  Turse's words are in standard font, while mine are in italics, plus the links. 

Washington puts its money on proxy warBy Nick Turse

Atimes.com

The changing face of empire
With ongoing military operations in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, the Obama administration has embraced a six-point program for light-footprint warfare relying heavily on special-operations forces, drones, spies, civilian partners, cyber-warfare and proxy fighters.

Africa: The following information comprised a sentence altogether, but I'm breaking apart the main elements here:

2011 war in Libya;

the expansion of a growing network of supply depots, small camps, and airfields; a regional drone campaign with missions run out of Djibouti, Ethiopia, and the Indian Ocean archipelago nation Seychelles;

See: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583012923076634.html

a flotilla of 30 ships in that ocean supporting regional operations;

a massive influx of cash for counter-terrorism operations across East Africa;

a possible old-fashioned air war, carried out on the sly in the region using manned aircraft;

and a special-ops expeditionary force (bolstered by State Department experts) dispatched to help capture or kill Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) leader Joseph Kony and his senior commanders.

In Somalia, Washington has already involved itself in a multi-pronged military and CIA campaign against Islamist al-Shabaab militants that includes:

intelligence operations,

training for Somali agents,

a secret prison,

helicopter attacks and

commando raids.

Now, it is also backing a classic proxy war using African surrogates. The United States has become, as the Los Angeles Times put it recently, "the driving force behind the fighting in Somalia", as it trains and equips African foot soldiers to battle Shabaab militants, so US forces won't have to. In a country where more than 90 Americans were killed and wounded in a 1993 debacle now known by the shorthand "Black Hawk Down", today's fighting and dying have been outsourced to African soldiers.

This year, for example, elite Force Recon marines from the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force 12 (or, as a mouthful of an abbreviation, SPMAGTF-12) trained soldiers from the Uganda People's Defense Force. It, in turn, supplies the majority of the troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) currently protecting the US-supported government in that country's capital, Mogadishu.

This spring, marines from SPMAGTF-12 also trained soldiers from the Burundi National Defense Force (BNDF), the second-largest contingent in Somalia. In April and May, members of Task Force Raptor, 3rd Squadron, 124th Cavalry Regiment of the Texas National Guard took part in a separate training mission with the BNDF in Mudubugu, Burundi. SPMAGTF-12 has also sent its trainers to Djibouti, another nation involved in the Somali mission, to work with an elite army unit there.

At the same time, US Army troops have taken part in training members of Sierra Leone's military in preparation for their deployment to Somalia later this year. In June, US Army Africa commander Major-General David Hogg spoke encouragingly of the future of Sierra Leone's forces in conjunction with another US ally, Kenya, which invaded Somalia last autumn (and just recently joined the African Union mission there). "You will join the Kenyan forces in southern Somalia to continue to push al-Shabaab and other miscreants from Somalia so it can be free of tyranny and terrorism and all the evil that comes with it," he said. "We know that you are ready and trained. You will be equipped and you will accomplish this mission with honor and dignity."

Readying allied militaries for deployment to Somalia is, however, just a fraction of the story when it comes to training indigenous forces in Africa. This year, for example, marines traveled to Liberia to focus on teaching riot-control techniques to that country's military as part of what is otherwise a State Department-directed effort to rebuild its security forces.

In fact, Colonel Tom Davis of US Africa Command (AFRICOM) recently told TomDispatch that his command had held or planned 14 major joint training exercises for 2012 and a similar number were scheduled for 2013. This year's efforts include operations in Morocco, Cameroon, Gabon, Botswana, South Africa, Lesotho, Senegal and Nigeria, including, for example, Western Accord 2012, a multilateral exercise involving the armed forces of Senegal, Burkina Fa.so, Guinea, Gambia and France.

Video on Western Accord 2012

Update 16 August 2012: Southern Accord 2012 ends. See DoD press release here.  The following is from the press release 

 Africom says the purpose of the exercise, the first of seven iterations of Southern Accord to be hosted by Botswana, is to train both militaries in peace keeping operations in Sub-Saharan Africa.  An ambitious training schedule covered the gamut, from tactical and peacekeeper training to humanitarian road building and medical outreach missions.

 ***
Even this, however, doesn't encompass the full breadth of US training and advising missions in Africa. "We ... conduct some type of military training or military-to-military engagement or activity with nearly every country on the African continent," Davis wrote. =========================================================================

LATIN AMERICA

Africa may, at present, be the prime location for the development of proxy warfare, American-style, but it's hardly the only locale where the United States is training indigenous forces to aid US foreign-policy aims. This year, the Pentagon has also ramped up operations in Central and South America as well as the Caribbean.

In Honduras, for example, small teams of US troops are working with local forces to escalate the drug war there. Working out of Forward Operating Base Mocoron and other remote camps, the US military is supporting Honduran operations by way of the methods it honed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

US forces have also taken part in joint operations with Honduran troops as part of a training mission dubbed Beyond the Horizon 2012, while Green Berets have been assisting Honduran special-operations forces in anti-smuggling operations.

Additionally, an increasingly militarized US Drug Enforcement Administration sent a Foreign-Deployed Advisory Support Team, originally created to disrupt the poppy trade in Afghanistan, to aid Honduras' Tactical Response Team, that country's elite counter-narcotics unit.

**Honduras**:

Controversy:  http://cnsnews.com/news/article/hondurans-demand-dea-leave-after-shooting

Alleged killing of innocents during assault on drug smuggglers sparks controversy

Promotional: http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/Beyond-The-Horizon-Honduras-Construction-Sites-Make-Steady-Progress.aspx

The militarization and foreign deployment of US law-enforcement operatives was also evident in Tradewinds 2012, a training exercise held in Barbados in June. There, members of the US military and civilian law-enforcement agencies joined with counterparts from Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago to improve cooperation for "complex multinational security operations".

**Tradewinds 2012**

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m39XbrC3YS0 (Opening ceremony)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d2zzKcmymfY

Far less visible have been training efforts by US special-operations forces in Guyana (http://shadowspear.com/special-operations-training/105911-fused-response-2012-us-guyana-special-ops.html), Uruguay and Paraguay (http://www.shadowspear.com/special-operations-training/106105-socsouth-uraguay-jcet.html). In June, special-ops troops also took part in Fuerzas Comando, an eight-day "competition" in which the elite forces from 21 countries, including the Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay, faced off in tests of physical fitness, marksmanship and tactical capabilities.

**Fuerzas Comando**: http://www.shadowspear.com/special-operations-entertainment/106078-fuerzas-comando-2012.html

**International Special Ops Forces Conference, Tampa Bay, May 2012**

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XKyMIgcdC9I

This year, the US military has also conducted training exercises in Guatemala, sponsored "partnership-building" missions in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Peru and Panama, and reached an agreement to carry out 19 "activities" with the Colombian army over the next year, including joint military exercises.

=====================================================

CHINA/ASIA

Coverage of the Obama administration's much-publicized strategic "pivot" to Asia has focused on the creation of yet more bases and new naval deployments to the region. The military (which has dropped the word "pivot" for "rebalancing") is, however, also planning and carrying out numerous exercises and training missions with regional allies. In fact, the US Navy and Marines Corps alone already reportedly engage in more than 170 bilateral and multilateral exercises with Asia-Pacific nations each year.

One of the largest of these efforts took place in and around the Hawaiian Islands from late June through early August. Dubbed RIMPAC 2012, the exercise brought together more than 40 ships and submarines, more than 200 aircraft, and 25,000 personnel from 22 nations, including Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Tonga.

**RIMPAC 2012** Promotional: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7aqGFRDilD0

Almost 7,000 American troops also joined about 3,400 Thai forces, as well as military personnel from Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea, as part of Cobra Gold 2012.

**Cobra Gold**: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t28Dneugu3A

US Marines Learn Jungle Survival Techniques (humorous):

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MqXAJh_LKvk

In addition, US marines took part in Hamel 2012, a multinational training exercise involving members of the Australian and New Zealand militaries, while other American troops joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines for Exercise Balikatan.

**Exercise Hamel**: 2010, just Australia: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-9wX1QUUTpQ

Multinational in 2012: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GUTWeknx5OA&feature=related

Exercise Balikitan:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DlbVkzgVHw

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0qbTty7qCsU

The effects of the "pivot" are also evident in the fact that once-neutralist India now holds more than 50 military exercises with the United States each year - more than any other country in the world.

**India-US**

Promotional 2012: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KRW38hKXCLY

While in 2008 India and China held a Joint Exercise, obviously without regard for the United States: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MzlnogUjMho

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jLCc0VhJZGc

What has changed?

2010: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5SFW-C53YMs

2012: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x6rNAyj4i68

"Our partnership with India is a key part of our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and, we believe, to the broader security and prosperity of the 21st century," said US Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter on a recent trip to the subcontinent.

Just how broad is evident in the fact that India is taking part in America's proxy effort in Somalia. In recent years, the Indian Navy has emerged as an "important contributor" to the international counter-piracy effort off that African country's coast, according to Andrew Shapiro of the US State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

===============================================================

China (and others) Take Notice of Obama's Rebalancing in Asia

In this media piece, the voice of the Chinese government reveals its concern for the rapid military buildup in terms of both arms and alliance that is defining the security environment of east and south Asia. The language is alarmist -- some quick examples:

Since the start of the year, U.S. armed forces have massively and incessantly engaged in joint military exercises in the Asia-Pacific region.

 It seems that the United States has developed a fresh yen for waging military exercises with its allies in the Asia-Pacific region. Apart from the drills' dazzling intensity, what is more alarming is that some of these exercises have even openly taken China as the imaginary enemy.

The Obama administration, since its first year in office, has demonstrated a fervent desire to deter China by strengthening its military alliances with countries like South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, as well as some other Southeast Asian nations.

By setting China as its simulated foe and making a parade of its military prowess in the region, the United States intends to send out a message that no one is allowed to challenge its dominant position in the region.

And the article invokes US electoral politics as well --

Another reason for the rising military involvement of Washington in the region this year is that by trying to play tough against China, Obama could hopefully woo more voters in his presidential race.

The U.S. moves, based on Cold War mentality, would only aggravate regional tensions and plague China-U.S. relations.

Moreover, they would embolden a few regional countries to take rather irresponsible attitudes when handling their maritime disputes with China, and further push the entire Asia-Pacific area to the brink of military conflict.

The electoral connection is low-hanging fruit, hard to resist. And no one would ever accuse me of being blind to the politics of foreign policy, indeed, I simply expect political advantage to be at minimum an unconsciously considered factor in a policy maker's decisions.  However, in this context the assertion is absurd. First, Obama did not create an Asia-centered foreign policy out of thin air. China's new great power status has been emerging for decades, and all presidents have had to deal with the complex mix of conflict and cooperation that defines Sino-American relations. As China has progressed as a world player and as a major trading partner with the United States, the issue of managing relations with China has risen steadily on presidential agendasas they work toward .  Major headline-grabbing crises between the two countries have been sporadic, and thus China may not always have been the most visible presidential priority, but relations have been steadily intensifying.  Thus, whoever would be president in 2012 other than Obama would undoubtedly be pursuing similar policies, though details may have varied. For example, it cannot be known if another president would have pursued the exact bilateral and multilateral alliances as the incumbent. Second, the military buildups on the scale of those Obama is pursuing in the Persian Gulf and in Asia are serious matters, not prone to superficial campaign tactics. The extensive diplomacy required by American civilian and military agencies and their international counterparts is simply not subject to electoral dynamics, though doubtless any successful diplomacy will be used as campaign fodder. Indeed, one motivation for this blog is to rebut many of the rather generic and typical criticisms levied at Obama's foreign policy.

It's clear that Obama's aggressive pursuit of alliances to establish a balance of power system in Asia is worrying the Chinese as they face a great deal more uncertainty  than many people realize, uncertainty in both domestic and international affairs.  Obama's Realpolitik is not without its benefits for those who advocate a values-driven foreign policy as Myanmar/Burma makes strides toward democracy as it gets closer to the U.S. (and farther from China), and even in Vietnam there may be glimmers of change along with international engagement.


In this piece published in an online Filipino news source, a militant group leader is quoted as warning against U.S. diplomatic and military moves in the region. In doing so, he presents a rather insightful summary of new and renewed U.S. relations with the Philippines, Australia,  etc.  The point, however, is to highlight the report as another indication that when the U.S. Navy moves in, potential aggressors take notice and sound a warning, hoping to use fear as an avenue for greater support. This goes for the CCCP as well a Filipino militia.  Walter Pincus of the Washington Post makes similar points about the Middle East, where a similar U.S. strategy is arming, training and organizing the Arab states and Gulf Cooperation Council into an international deterrent against Iran.

The next post will include a listing and video/documentary summaries of recent major international military exercises that the United States is using to build, solidify, and prepare these incipient coalitions.

Drezner in Foreign Policy blog: Romney's Talk of Culture and Economic Development

Daniel Drezner's blog on the Foreign Policy webpage summarizes his and others' views on the comments Romney made in Israel and his subsequent attempts to contextualize or clarify them. Good explanation of the difference between culture and political/economic institutions that Romney does not seem to understand. Interesting that Zakaria invokes Milton Friedman a day or so after Friedman's centenary.

In Reply to Op-Ed by Dr. Condoleeza Rice in Financial Times

The Financial Times asks readers to not copy and post to the web their content. However, this op-ed by Dr. Condoleeza Rice is garnering attention, including from analysts who include part of the essay. I did abridge the essay carefully so as to not post the entire essay contrary to FT's wishes. My comments are in italics.

July 26, 2012 8:37 pm+ www.ft.com

US must recall it is not just any country

By Condoleezza Rice

In this young century, the 9/11 attacks, the global financial crisis and the unrest in the Arab world have struck at the heart of vital US interests. If Americans want the tectonic plates of the international system to settle in a way that makes the world safer, freer and more prosperous, the US must overcome its reluctance to lead....


The problem with short op-ed essays, of course, is the inability to fully define what one means when using terms such as"safer, freer and more prosperous." The predictable response to this statement is to assert the obvious or even self-evident meanings of safety, freedom, and prosperity. But there is much to ask about these goals. First, safety, which can be taken to be interchangeable with security in the common language of national security policy. However laudable is the goal of a world of states and non-state actors and individuals sharing a clear perception of safety, in a world currently constituted by no expectations of Great Power war and indeed in which the number of interstate wars ongoing is at a historical low point, there remains a set of challenges that Dr. Rice justifiably raises in this piece and elsewhere. So, what are the security challenges and how should the United States approach them -- and, in the political realm what do we make of Dr. Rice's critiques of the Obama Administration's foreign policy record to date?


The list of US foreign policy challenges is long and there will be a temptation to respond tactically to each one. But today’s headlines and posterity’s judgment often differ. The task at hand is to strengthen the pillars of our influence and act with the long arc of history in mind.


Very eloquent, and an excellent reminder that strategic thinking is critical to long-term success. What adds complexity and difficulty to carrying out this suggestion is that crises do happen and quick responses are expected, with considerable political pressure on decision-makers to act in ways that may not allow for adequate application of long-term strategic plans in the immediacy of crises. Let's take the situation in Syria. 
 
In the Middle East we must patiently use our aid, expertise and influence to support the creation of inclusive democratic institutions. The fundamental problem in the region is the absence of institutions that can bridge the Sunni-Shia divide, and protect the rights of women and minorities. Even as we make necessary immediate choices – including arming the Syrian rebels – we must insist upon inclusive politics. The US cannot afford to stand aside; regional powers will bring their own agendas that could exacerbate confessional divisions.



Nothing inaccurate here. The problem is the lack of any idea of how the United States can overcome this "fundamental problem." The Sunni-Shia divide is nearly as old as Islam, and is exponentially exacerbated when combined with geopolitical tensions, nationalist, ethnic and tribal rivalries, and a host of additional sectarian identities including the Alawites, who comprise 12% of Syria but has been ruthlessly governing for decades under both Assads. It seems a consensus is rapidly building around the idea that Bahsir al-Assad is not going to be in office for much longer, but also that he is unlikely to go down without additional and horrendous assaults. Therefore, arming and otherwise supporting the rebels is a logical suggestion -- except it raises the question of how such actions align with the long-term, strategic vision that Rice rightfully says should be our guide. The fall of Assad and his military dictatorship would remove a long-standing ruthless regime and would rob Iran of an important (if not always reliable) partner in furtherance of its regional power ambitions. But given Dr. Rice raises the issue of Iraq next, what evidence does she offer to indicate what lessons of Iraq should be applied to Syria? Shaping a post-civil war Syria offers many of the same challenges our overthrow of Saddam unleashed throughout Iraq -- tribal and sectarian war, military-civilian power struggles, and a lack of civil society as a basis for growing democratic values. In spite of these unknowns, the Obama Administration has acted in ways that critics such as Dr. Rice should appreciate. Perhaps the level, speed, and overtness of American support for the Syrian rebels have not matched what Dr. Rice and Mr. Romney seem to be calling for, but they have not adequately portrayed how this support should manifest, what limits should be placed on such support, and how we should prepare for the likelihood that weapons and resources we supply will end up in very unsavory hands, including some in the rebellion who have their own agendas to pursue. In short, many of the same questions that were raised during the NATO attack on Libya can be raised here, namely, just what mix of good guys and bad guys comprises the Syrian rebellion? Does being anti-Assad alone qualify one as pro-democracy? I think we all know the answer. 
 
As we work with reformers across the region, we should not forget that Iraq has the kind of institutions that are meant to overcome these divisions. Given its geostrategic importance, the chaos engulfing its neighbours and Iran’s destructive influence, our re-engagement with Baghdad is sorely needed.



I find these statements on Iraq to be very interesting. If I was the type to be blunt, I'd say that what they reveal is a continuation of the same willful blindness to the realities of Iraq that created the conditions there in the first place. First, the reason Iran's influence is so great is that the U.S. removed one of Iran's greatest enemies in Saddam Hussein. I've always marveled at how little significance was accorded the fact that so many of post-Saddam Iraq's leaders had spent decades in Iran. Perhaps there was a theory that returning to Iraq would be an Etch-a-Sketch moment for these Shi'ite leaders and they would govern without regard to sectarianism.

So just what would "re-engagement" with Iraq look like? I get the feeling that by re-engagement, she really means the re-establishment of American hegemony of Iraq, but Iraq is a sovereign state now, and while its behavior should not be unmet with consequences, at some level its diplomatic priorities are its own. In Iraqi Kurdistan, the U.S. has a fine line to walk, between allying with the Kurds and not provoking the ire of Turkey who cannot allow Kurdish independence movements to succeed anywhere.


The US needs to turn again to the development of responsible and democratic sovereigns beyond the Middle East. The George W. Bush administration doubled aid spending worldwide and quadrupled it to Africa. It channelled assistance to countries that were investing in their people’s health and education, governing wisely and democratically, building open economies and fighting corruption.... US tax dollars will have been well spent.


Now this is interesting. Not that I disagree with her; she makes good sense. However, I look forward to seeing either Romney supporter or perhaps even Vice Presidential candidate Condoleeza Rice promoting increased foreign aid to the GOP national convention and TEA Party crowds. I do not think it would go over well.


We must also not lose sight of how democracy is solidifying in the western hemisphere. US assistance and trade policy can help democracies in Latin America to provide an answer to populist dictators. At the same time, we must speak out for dissidents – from Cuba to Venezuela to Nicaragua. Mexico needs attention across a broad agenda that includes the devastating security challenge that threatens both it and the US.


Another good set of points. Latin America has declined on the American agenda overall, but our relationship with Brazil has seen considerable improvement under its new president, illustrating that the United States, under presidents of either party, is subject to foreign environments in part defined by the domestic politics of other sovereign states. The threat of Chavez is overblown. The situation in Mexico is one I see as a strong national security interest. I look forward to hearing whatever may be said about Mexico in the presidential debates.


The US “pivot” to Asia (a region that had hardly been abandoned) has focused heavily on security issues. America should remain the pre-eminent military power in the Pacific. But consider this: China has signed free-trade agreements with 15 nations over the past eight years and has explored FTAs with some 20 others; since 2009 the US has ratified three FTAs negotiated during the Bush administration and it has continued – but not concluded – talks on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which began in 2008...


All true, though it's deceptive to compare a high number of recent FTAs established by China in comparison with U.S. action in this area, when the U.S. has been a free trade leader for many years. It's interesting that Dr. Rice rather cavalierly dismisses the security-centered strategy pursued by President Obama. Additionally, the security, political and economic dynamics of our relationships are not completely discrete categories of policy. There are cross-cutting influences. Consider a recent analysis by a former South Vietnamese General in which he lays out the possibility for democratic gains in Vietnam stemming from the closer relations the United States has pursued under President Obama, which has largely been focused on security relations (arms sales and military exercises). This analysis can be found here. His concluding paragraphs are worth highlighting:


"Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, also underscores the importance of freedom and human rights in emerging nations. During a visit to Mongolia earlier this month, she touted the recent democratic reforms in Asian countries such as Mongolia, Myanmar and East Timor. She also visited Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to push for greater democratic reforms across Asia.

There is a saying in Vietnam that if the Vietnamese communist government follows China, it will lose the country; and if it sides with the United States, it will lose the party. Recent events show that the Vietnamese communist leadership appears ready to accept the consequences of a closer strategic cooperation with the United States. They may have a hunch, indeed, that the United States containment scheme against China may succeed – like the one against the Soviet bloc had succeeded during the Cold War era -– and that the collapse of the Chinese communist regime is only a question of time because China is facing unsurmountable (sic) ethnic, economic, political and social dilemmas. Thus, it may be time for them to jump ship before it is too late.

If the recent collapse of long-established dictatorial regimes in North Africa and the Middle East, the subsequent political reforms in Myanmar, Mongolia and East Timor, and the seemingly relentless spread of democratic values across the globe are any indication, don’t be surprised if the long-awaited Asian Spring is already on the horizon."


In sum, once again a Romney supporter over-generalizes her critique of actual U.S. foreign policy under President Obama. It seems that with nearly every statement it takes less and less time to refute them, as they descend to talking points.

A robust free trade policy will strengthen our economy and influence abroad, as will developing our domestic resources, such as the North American energy platform. High oil prices empower Venezuela, Russia and Iran. We are developing alternative sources of energy but they will not replace hydrocarbons for a long time. ....


A rather tepid statement on energy policy, which is usually a strong component of Obama criticism. When it comes to alternative sources of energy, whether natural gas or solar energy, one problem is that the technology has become subject to market gluts that make it less profitable to invest in them. People can scream unachievable goals about national energy independence, but they don't seem to realize that is not going to happen because the very actors they depend on to provide that independence are putting profit over nationalism, as is their function.


Most important, we need to reassure our friends across the globe.


I have long been put off by the way commentators treat the subject of international alliances. First, there is the common use of the word "friend" or "friends" in reference to sovereign states with which the United States has strong and mostly positive relations. While the use of the informal "friends" is not unheard in public diplomacy, the way that the topic of friends/allies is treated by political officials and pundits creates a false impression, an image of a complex interstate relationship being reduced to an interpersonal relationship. Sovereign states shape their relations with each of the other states in accordance with their perceived national interests, first and foremost their interest in sustaining and growing their power status. This is especially so for the world's stronger powers, and it is what especially bothers me about how these relationships are discussed, particularly relative to Israel. What I see in President Obama's treatment of Israel is classic Realism, or Realpolitik -- power politics. One of the most respected scholars of the 20th century, Hans Morgenthau, offered the following nine principles of international politics from the Realist perspective:

1. Diplomacy must be divested of the crusading spirit. . . .

2. The objectives of foreign policy must be defined in terms of the national interest and must be

supported with adequate power. . ..

3. Diplomacy must look at the political scene from the point of view of other nations.

4. Nations must be willing to compromise on all issues that are not vital to them.

5. Give up the shadow of worthless rights for the substance of real advantage. . . .

6. Never put yourself in situation from which you cannot retreat without losing face and from

which you cannot advance without grave risks. . . .

7. Never allow a weak ally to make decisions for you. . . .

8. The armed forces are the instrument of foreign policy, not its master.

9. The government is the leader of public opinion, not its slave.

Dr. Morgenthau's work dates to the 1940s, but I see much value in reviewing at least some of these rules of the road. In regard to the United States' relationship with important but asymmetric allies such as Israel, I've often cited #7 in reply to what I see as a call to abdicate U.S. independent action to the will of Israel. Also, little reference is made regarding Israel's treatment of the United States. This recent bit of news is a case in point: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/news/ap/politics/2012/Jul/28/us_sees_israel__tight_mideast_ally__as_spy_threat.html


But even beyond dramatic news about Israeli espionage against the United States, Israel has continually adopted a position defined far more by expectations than by any sense of deference. As a former CIA hand was recently quoted,


"It's a complicated relationship," said Joseph Wippl, a former senior CIA clandestine officer and head of the agency's office of congressional affairs. "They have their interests. We have our interests. For the U.S., it's a balancing act."


As the superpower of the pair, the United States under administrations of presidents such as Nixon, GHW Bush and Obama have occasionally approached U.S. relations with Israel and the Arab states from a pragmatic perspective. Lately I've been reading The Kissinger Transcripts, which are deeply revealing of how distant that Republican administration was from current GOP policy stances. American policy remained pro-Israel throughout, but was also based on a classic Realist construction based on balances of power. This has often been described as a more balanced approach,which is accurate, but a specific benefit of Realism is a greater likelihood of pursuing policy that reflects mutual interest among the principal states, such as the interest in a non-nuclear Iran shared by the Israelis, Arabs and Turks.


The rush to court adversaries has overshadowed relations with trusted allies.


Not unlike the propensity and practice of Nixon/Kissinger, Obama's policies have taken the form of a classic balance of power-based containment strategy vis-a-vis both China and Iran. Arms sales and military exercises have sent clear messages to China and to Iran, as evidenced by both states' public complaints. At the same time, Obama followed up on his campaign pledges to offer the opportunity for engagement with such states with whom the United States has had increasingly tense relations. As Dr. Rice's statement below says, Obama's offers were rebutted -- but what is left unsaid is that Iran is suffering the consequences of its intransigence. As for Venezuela's Chavez, his illness and general failure to build an effective anti-American coalition have sidelined him from serious consideration. As for Brazil, the previous Brazilian president asserted an independent path and was rather cool to the United States, but since their most recent election the relationship has grown warmer. Turkey is struggling to define itself through its foreign policy, working with the United States, Israel, and Europe when in its national interest to do so. Turkey is a vital player in the international storm brewing around Syria, and will be a deciding voice in the long term future of the Kurds in Iraq and Syria. To the extent that the United States and Turkey have mutual interests -- regardless of who is President -- there will be a corresponding degree of cooperation.


Our engagement with Europe has been sporadic and sometimes dismissive. Strategic ties with India, Brazil and Turkey have neither strengthened nor deepened in recent years. Hugo Chávez and the Iranians have bitten off the extended hand of friendship. There is no Palestinian state because it will only come through negotiation with a secure Israel that is confident in its relationship with the US. The decision to abandon missile defence sites in Poland and the Czech Republic, to “reset” relations with Russia was pocketed by Vladimir Putin who quickly returned to his anti-American ways. Friends must be able to trust in the consistency of our commitment to them.


I don't quite agree with Dr. Rice's statement on Europe. For one thing, she completely ignores the depth to which the United States has been involved in managing the Eurozone crisis through the Fed and through the International Monetary Fund. However, the overall point is not without validity, i.e., that U.S. policy toward Europe has not made the headlines relative to areas in which the United States has been at war for over ten years or in which the United States is most likely to face its biggest 21st century challenges, namely China and Asia more generally. The United States and western Europe have highly institutionalized relationships across the board -- economically, culturally and militarily -- and even relations with the former eastern bloc nations are stable enough to suffer mostly minor disturbances compared with the what we're seeing in the Middle East and the South China Sea.


On the topic of Israel, I do not know how much more clearly the political, military and intelligence leaders of Israel can state what benefits they have seen in Obama's treatment of Israel, nor why their very positive statements about this relationship are blatantly ignored by people who have what seems to be a deeply felt emotional need for Obama to be anti-Israel so that they can literally demonize him on a topic many see as important on a biblical scale. The same people who often speak reverently about the Israeli defense and intelligence establishments, with Mossad imbued with almost mythical powers (to the point where the most popular crime drama on network television features a former Mossad agent, the daughter of the Mossad director no less) -- these same people will completely ignore or dismiss the repeated praise heaped upon President Obama's security-centered relationship with Israel. In sum, Obama's chilly relations with Netanyahu are not the same as US relations with Israel. This is in no way unprecedented -- Nixon was a horrid anti-Semite but backed Israel strongly in '73 and he's considered pragmatic on the topic of Israel (pragmatic being a characteristic of what Wolfowitz derisively called "the reality based crowd"); Kissinger came closer to tying anti-Semitism to policy. But the point is that Obama does have rough relations with Bibi (but much better relations with Mossad), and such things are two way streets. What has Obama actually done? He vetoed Palestinian statehood vote in UNSC. He is supplying the Iron Dome rocket defense system on terms very favorable to Israel. His intervention rescued Israeli diplomats stuck in Embassy in revolutionary Egypt. He is building an anti-Iran coalition with Arabs and Turks, (including massive buildup in Persian Gulf and institutionalize Gulf Cooperation Council as political-military organization), which Israel supports......




Poland will be the base of missile defense technology that is proving quite promising. The criticism of Obama's alleged insult to Poland by changing the GW Bush plan has been based on a superficial understanding of the issues. First, questions are never raised about the details of the Bush deployment plans -- for example, was the technology feasible, and when would it be in place with confidence? In short, the technology was undeveloped and untested. The Obama administration changed strategies, and with that changed deployment plans to a more realistic and adaptable system which added a layer of sea-based anti-missile technology. The point is that it was a U.S.-led strategy and U.S.-supplied technology and forces offered in the interests of the United States and thus if the Commander-in-Chief shifts the geographic focus of a policy as broad and significant as ballistic missile defense, the lesser power partners may find themselves having to accept such changes. As in the current case of U.S.-Poland relationship, the lesser power's national interest in remaining broadly aligned with the greater power (aka band wagoning) will likely be unchanged.
In sum, more attention needs to be paid to the implications of words such as "friends and allies" in international relations. Even within the formal definition of an alliance -- as documented in a security treaty of some sort -- there are gradations. For example, the United States has led the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for over sixty years, and in the last twenty years the U.S. has placed fifteen countries in the category of "Major Non-NATO Ally."


Finally we cannot forget that strength begins at home. Global leadership rests upon a strong economy built on fiscal discipline and robust private sector growth. Ultimately, our success depends on mobilising human potential, something the US has done better than any country in history. Ours has been a story of possibility, not grievance and entitlement. Ambitious people have come from all over the world to seek out the opportunities America provides. The absence of a humane and sustainable national immigration policy threatens this great asset.
Our talent has historically come from every part of American society, without regard to class and economic circumstance. But when a child’s zip code determines whether she will get a good education, we are losing generations to poverty and despair. The crisis in US education is the greatest single threat to our national strength and cohesion.


The American people have to be inspired to lead again. They need to be reminded that the US is not just any other country: we are exceptional in the clarity of our conviction that free markets and free peoples hold the key to the future, and in our willingness to act on those beliefs. Failure to do so would leave a vacuum, likely filled by those who will not champion a balance of power that favours freedom. That would be a tragedy for American interests and values and those who share them.




I don't have much to say about the concluding paragraphs, as they are mostly repetitive of common general themes. Not to be snarky, but I do often wonder how American values can be exceptional and universal at the same time. The concept of leadership likely will be common in the electoral discussions. I just have to wonder if thought is ever given to exactly what this means, and more to the point to the extensive costs of leadership and the obstacles to leadership which are often out of one's control. A great number of words have been spilled about the "lead from behind" comment unfortunately made by a staffer. It has proven to be low-hanging fruit for Obama's critics. But even in the context of the Libyan war in which it was spoken, the phrase has little meaning. British and French warplanes did fly a greater proportion of sorties than has been the norm for NATO conflicts, but I fail to see how that's a negative, when for years I've heard American critics of Europe demand that they contribute more to alliance operations. Also, eighty-percent of the fuel they used was supplied by the United States. American commanders expressed frustration at how, after so many years of promoting interoperability, European military forces still cannot communicate effectively with one another, illustrating again the superior capabilities of the United States.




Dr. Rice favors continued and perhaps expanded foreign aid programs, more "humane" immigration policies, and she seems to argue for a more equitable distribution of education resources domestically, which makes me wonder again how this will fly with the Tea Party crowd, assuming she is a serious potential for VP. As for her final two sentences, she returns to President George W. Bush's terminology with "a balance of power that favours freedom." Ethnocentrism runs rampant, that is, the assumption that what and how we (assuming there's even an agreement among "us") define freedom is universal. After reports of true atrocities committed by insurgents in Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, Libya and Syria, it does not seem too much to ask, "freedom for whom, and to do what, exactly?" No one is unhappy about seeing the dictators fall, even if they were useful to U.S. policy at various times. But that does not mean we can drop critical questions when it comes to political change worldwide. Revolutions have a way of spinning out of control. It is simply not enough to proclaim support for noble causes such as freedom.


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The writer is a former US secretary of state

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2012.