The Energy Security Leadership Council, led by a number of retired general officers of the U.S. armed forces and CEOs of corporations such as Fed-Ex, released this report on expected consequences of increased domestic energy production, particularly through increased drilling for oil and natural gas. As the report emphasizes, a fundamental problem in the American debate over increased domestic production is the mistaken use of the term "energy independence" and the misunderstanding of what energy security really means. Additionally, the authors present convincing evidence that the benefits of increased oil/gas supplies will be felt in a reduced trade deficit and increased employment. However, expected benefits in the form of lower gasoline prices and reduced commitments to volatile geopolitical regions are shown to be quite mistaken. The following conclusions of the report are worth reproducing:
"As U.S. levels of oil imports continue to fall, the trade deficit will improve, and the transfer of U.S. wealth abroad will decrease. This will help strengthen the dollar and increase investment in the domestic economy, where productive capital tends to have an extremely beneficial impact on growth.
Overall employment will benefit as well, with tens-of-thousands of new direct jobs in the oil and gas industry driving creation of many more indirect jobs throughout the economy. In short, the domestic oil industry could be a boon for the U.S. economy at a time when it is struggling to recover from the worst recession in 70 years.
But it is important to be clear-eyed about the effect the boom in oil production will have on American energy security. Rising domestic production will not shield consumers from oil price volatility, and it will not lower gasoline prices over the long term. It will also not allow the United States to abdicate its role in the Middle East.
America’s dependence on oil represents one of the most dangerous and pressing national security threats facing the country today. This threat, which is overwhelmingly a function of the importance of oil in the domestic economy, will not be substantially altered by rising levels of domestic oil production and falling imports.The fact is that as long as the United States remains dependent on oil as the primary fuel in our transportation sector, the nation will remain vulnerable to the effects of oil price volatility and debilitating price shocks. Critically, there is little the American policy apparatus can do to minimize the occurrence of volatility in oil prices, as it is primarily driven by events in dozens of consuming and producing countries around the world. The oil market is truly global in nature and scope.
In working to enhance American energy security, policymakers must set aside empty goals and
slogans, like energy independence, and focus on the hard work at hand: continuing to increase the efficiency of the automotive fleet through vehicle fuel-economy standards, investing in the research and development needed to commercialize advanced vehicle drivetrain technologies that greatly reduce or eliminate oil use, and supporting deployment of current-generation non-petroleum transportation fuels such as electricity and natural gas to diversify our energy sources. On all of these fronts, the United States has made some important, initial strides in recent years. With oil markets growing increasingly volatile based on continued demand growth in emerging markets and geopolitical instability in the Middle East, now is the time to redouble our commitment to those strategies. Today, as ever, dramatically reducing our consumption of oil is the surest path to national energy security."
Wednesday, May 16, 2012
Tuesday, May 15, 2012
Political & Military Realities in Afghanistan: Two Readings Recommended
The New York Times asks, "Is There a Romney Doctrine?" and proceeds to document the impossibility of arriving at an answer at this point in time. The article is based largely on unattributed interviews, due to clear statements from the staffers that they would face punitive measures if their participation in the interviews were known (as would be the case in any presidential campaign). The crux of that and of the article can be found in this excerpt:
'Another adviser, saying he would be “cashiered” if the campaign caught him talking to a reporter without approval, said the real answer was that “Romney doesn’t want to really engage these issues until he is in office”."
Perhaps Mr. Romney figures he'll have more "flexibility" after the election.
In the meantime, most discussion of foreign policy in the popular media reflects the broader ideological landscape of this election, in which each side distorts the views and record of the other side, and knee-jerks itself into automatic reactions to anything associated with political opponents. As most everyone acknowledges, even while perpetuating the behavior, the stakes associated with discussing much of foreign policy on the campaign trail are higher than the long-term domestic priorities such as the economy and social services. The president's use of the raid against bin Laden to promote his candidacy is at the same time questionable in taste and entirely defensible given the opposition's insistence that the president run for re-election on his record. Of course, they would prefer to focus on less successful aspects of his record, but once the door is open, the consequences are entirely predictable. In any case, the touting of the bin Laden assassination can backfire for the incumbent, especially with independent voters. Also, Romney's criticism of President Obama's trip to Afghanistan recently was roundly criticized by all sides, both for symbolic reasons (criticizing the President while he is out of the country) and substantive (the delicate status of the entire Afghanistan situation). There's little doubt such things will continue, which is par for the democratic course, but are also consequential in the real world beyond campaigning.
It will be interesting to see how Afghanistan is treated in the remainder of the election season given the rapid transitions underway. There are many aspects that can be subject to political manipulation
I would like to offer two works that provide proper background and perspective. The first is a widely respected RAND Corporation document called Afghan Peace Talks: A Primer. Fair warning, it's about 120 pages of text, but contains valuable insight on the current and possible future of efforts to end the war and to pursue U.S. interests through other means. The very phrase, "peace talks with the Taleban" can be used as a political tool most easily, with charges of appeasement and other misapplied historical lessons. Understanding reality, as usual, is difficult in the soundbite world of political campaigns, but is vital if we are going to be an informed nation debating a policy in which we have invested so much. In this publication from the National Defense University, the reader will find very important historical developments that explain how the Taleban arrived at their current status, in which they exercise some political and judicial powers though largely lacking the political legitimacy they seek. The article can be found here. It was in 2003 that the Taleban augmented their militant insurgency with a "soft power" type strategy. I cannot help but conclude that the diversion of U.S. attention from Afghanistan to Iraq at this time contributed to the Taleban's limited success in its endeavors. It is difficult to not wonder what a sustained all out offensive in Afghanistan could have accomplished without the diversion of resources and attention to Iraq.
Because U.S. strategy for Afghanistan is to a large degree dependent on success in the effort to regionalize the problem. It is difficult to discuss such a complex strategy when the politics of the Central Asian region are very delicate and by no means settled. Negotiations on pipeline and railroad routes, for example, require the satisfaction of some interests (for example, as a means of tying Afghanistan to the region in a productive, non-narcotic manner) and will result (purposefully in these cases) in the dissatisfaction of others (how might Iran, Russia and China react?). See my earlier posts for more on this strategy, to which I'll return soon.
'Another adviser, saying he would be “cashiered” if the campaign caught him talking to a reporter without approval, said the real answer was that “Romney doesn’t want to really engage these issues until he is in office”."
Perhaps Mr. Romney figures he'll have more "flexibility" after the election.
In the meantime, most discussion of foreign policy in the popular media reflects the broader ideological landscape of this election, in which each side distorts the views and record of the other side, and knee-jerks itself into automatic reactions to anything associated with political opponents. As most everyone acknowledges, even while perpetuating the behavior, the stakes associated with discussing much of foreign policy on the campaign trail are higher than the long-term domestic priorities such as the economy and social services. The president's use of the raid against bin Laden to promote his candidacy is at the same time questionable in taste and entirely defensible given the opposition's insistence that the president run for re-election on his record. Of course, they would prefer to focus on less successful aspects of his record, but once the door is open, the consequences are entirely predictable. In any case, the touting of the bin Laden assassination can backfire for the incumbent, especially with independent voters. Also, Romney's criticism of President Obama's trip to Afghanistan recently was roundly criticized by all sides, both for symbolic reasons (criticizing the President while he is out of the country) and substantive (the delicate status of the entire Afghanistan situation). There's little doubt such things will continue, which is par for the democratic course, but are also consequential in the real world beyond campaigning.
It will be interesting to see how Afghanistan is treated in the remainder of the election season given the rapid transitions underway. There are many aspects that can be subject to political manipulation
I would like to offer two works that provide proper background and perspective. The first is a widely respected RAND Corporation document called Afghan Peace Talks: A Primer. Fair warning, it's about 120 pages of text, but contains valuable insight on the current and possible future of efforts to end the war and to pursue U.S. interests through other means. The very phrase, "peace talks with the Taleban" can be used as a political tool most easily, with charges of appeasement and other misapplied historical lessons. Understanding reality, as usual, is difficult in the soundbite world of political campaigns, but is vital if we are going to be an informed nation debating a policy in which we have invested so much. In this publication from the National Defense University, the reader will find very important historical developments that explain how the Taleban arrived at their current status, in which they exercise some political and judicial powers though largely lacking the political legitimacy they seek. The article can be found here. It was in 2003 that the Taleban augmented their militant insurgency with a "soft power" type strategy. I cannot help but conclude that the diversion of U.S. attention from Afghanistan to Iraq at this time contributed to the Taleban's limited success in its endeavors. It is difficult to not wonder what a sustained all out offensive in Afghanistan could have accomplished without the diversion of resources and attention to Iraq.
Because U.S. strategy for Afghanistan is to a large degree dependent on success in the effort to regionalize the problem. It is difficult to discuss such a complex strategy when the politics of the Central Asian region are very delicate and by no means settled. Negotiations on pipeline and railroad routes, for example, require the satisfaction of some interests (for example, as a means of tying Afghanistan to the region in a productive, non-narcotic manner) and will result (purposefully in these cases) in the dissatisfaction of others (how might Iran, Russia and China react?). See my earlier posts for more on this strategy, to which I'll return soon.
Friday, May 4, 2012
The United States and Iran: Pressures, Pipelines and Persians
May 7, 2012, and spring semester is on the shelf. Always a good feeling to bring these 16 week projects we call classes to conclusion, especially after missing so much last year due to way too much death and illness.
I'm adding to the posts below that I linked to a couple of days ago, and adding some commentary. It looks like I've pretty much limited myself to this blog and will use Global Courses more for teaching materials and specific research projects. The security-related topics I cover here are....or should be...of much importance as the election approaches as well as for general purposes. For example, part of the reason I'm more focused than ever on the Gulf Cooperation Council was illustrated clearer than I could ever do by Senator Marc Rubio on Fox News Sunday with Chris Wallace. Rubio said the following (from FNS transcripts):
"But I do think that we need to do a better job of beginning to prepare our allies in the world for the reality that, at the end of the day, if negotiations and sanctions don't work, there will be a need for military action, because what we cannot tolerate, and I think the world would agree, what we cannot tolerate is a nuclear Iran."
This was a quick statement whose details were not explored farther. However, given what Sen. Rubio surely knows -- or can quickly find out -- about the Obama Administration's policies toward the Arab countries in the Persian Gulf region that have added up to a revitalized Gulf Cooperation Council, $100 billion in arms sales ($60 bn of that to Saudi Arabia, who is a vital ally against Iran). I believe this $100 billion of sales under Obama just about quintuple the sales to Arab states under George W. Bush. I'll try to confirm that, but it seems I remember seeing $100 bn v. $22 bn in this regard. There are also the reports of Obama's transfer of F-22's to UAE (although F-22s are facing their own issues, with U.S. pilots complaining of oxygen problems). As the Wall Street Journal published on 11/11/11:
The Obama administration has quietly drawn up plans to provide a key Persian Gulf ally with thousands of advanced "bunker-buster" bombs and other munitions, part of a stepped-up U.S. effort to build a regional coalition to counter Iran.
The proposed sale to the United Arab Emirates would vastly expand the existing capabilities of the country's air force to target fixed structures, which could include bunkers and tunnels—the kind of installations where Iran is believed to be developing weapons.
The move represents one way the Obama administration intends to keep Iran in check....
In sum, U.S. deployments, diplomacy and arms sales add up to a strategy of encircling Iran with well-armed Arab states, many of which would likely pursue nuclear weapons if Iran does, which is another factor in Iran's calculations. This doesn't account for the continued arms cooperation with Israel, the role of Turkey in containing and/or fighting Iran, and additional developments in Azerbaijan (arms cooperation with Israel) and Afghanistan (U.S. retains a military presence).
Further below are reports on the issue of three islands contested by Iran and UAE, and occupied by Iran since the Shah's reign. This is an issue that can provide the spark for conflict, or at least brinkmanship. Given the attention the US has showered on UAE, and our backing of UAE in this dispute, as well as the islands' location near the Strait of Hormuz, I think this is a reasonable expectation.
5/5/12
It's end-of-semester grading time, so I'll return to this soon, but I wanted to bring attention to two parallel scenarios that are subject to very short term pressures. First is an escalation of a dispute between the United Arab Emirates and Iran over three islands occupied by Iran in spite of UAE claims to them -- Abu Musa, Greater (or Big) Tunb and Lesser (or Little) Tunb. These islands are located in one of the most strategically significant -- and fragile -- places in the world: the Strait of Hormuz. It's no surprise, then, that the U.S. is becoming increasingly involved in the situation while taking advantage of UAE's strategic location for deterring or defeating Iran and President Obama's military buildup of the Gulf Cooperation Council, turning it into a Persian Gulf NATO of sorts. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have been the two biggest partners in the recent and significant increase in U.S. arms sales to GCC states, and this week saw reports of the U.S. deploying fifth generation steath F-22s to UAE.
The second situation involves the recent signing of the U.S.-Afghanistan agreement establishing a framework to guide relations over the next decade or so. The links I provide here focus on the Obama Administration's New Silk Road Project, by which Afghan descent into failed state status will in part by countered by a regional strategy of engagement. Within this framework, the future of Afghanistan as a major energy transit zone is vital. To both complicate matters and tie them to the U.S. effort against Iran, the Trans-Afghanistan and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline projects are indicative not only of the New Silk Road Strategy but also of U.S. efforts to avoid both Iran and Russia when settling oil and gas transit routes. While pipeline negotiations have gone alternative on and off over the past decade, there has been recent progress that makes the topic worth pursuing.
May 4, 2012: Reports of escalating tensions over the three disputed islands have become more frequent. http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=39331&tx_ttnews[backPid]=26&cHash=b2f5359e1a3d9522a1a336d1a6ef4bf9
and
http://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/boundary_news/?itemno=14513
April 29, 2012 report: Gulf states hold military exercises in clear reference to islands at center of Iran-UAE dispute:
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/Arab-States-Hold-War-Games-as-Tensions-With-Iran-Mount-149425335.html
April 17, 2012: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/apr/17/iran-leaders-visit-to-island-reignites-feud-with-e/
Also, a report highlighting positive support for UAE from Kuwait on this issue in particular:
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-1.asp?section=nationgeneral&xfile=data/nationgeneral/2012/april/nationgeneral_april193.xml
As well as France and Italy:
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-1.asp?section=government&xfile=data/government/2012/april/government_april40.xml
The Arab League also seizes on this issue:
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-1.asp?section=middleeast&xfile=data/middleeast/2012/april/middleeast_april275.xml
Escalating tensions over the islands dispute at this particular point in time, in combination with war games, U.S. arms sales and transfer of F-22s to UAE, and long-simmering concerns over the Strait of Hormuz, all point to the possibility of a casus belli, that is, a claim or even military move by UAE to reclaim the islands. International law, with the possibility of a UAE case against Iran brought to the International Court of Justice, can once again lend a legitimizing cover for preventative warfare.
An example of arms sales as part of the strategy of encircling/containing/deterring/defeating Iran with regional powers, from a November 2011 story on considerations of selling precision-guided bombs to UAE:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/11/us-usa-uae-bombs-idUSTRE7AA0VT20111111
Consider also the timing of this stories from the Khaleej Times on a "dazzling display" of military might by the UAE:
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-1.asp?xfile=data/government/2012/May/government_May4.xml§ion=government
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Another element of the counter-Iran coalition is the high priority to the politics of pipelines. Not only has it long been U.S. policy to craft a pipeline transit policy that avoids benefiting both Iran and Russia, recent developments deserve attention. Of general/background interest: Congressional Research Service 2012 report on sanctions against Iran a recent and comprehensive overview:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf
Next is the significance of the The New Silk Road Project as a key part of U.S. strategy for the future of Afghanistan. My friends in the field of Regional Studies may rejoice that regionalism is back, as illustrated with the plan to embed Afghanistan's survival and development to its immediate geopolitical region, and projects such as the Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline (TAP) and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) Pipeline are high stakes attempts to implement the strategy.
May 3, 2012: US Afghan plan: (1) Asia Times and (2) Oil and Glory Blog (FP)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/NE03Df01.html
http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/03/should_us_troops_really_spend_another_12_years_in_a_bloodied_afghan_seige
and I usually find this blog well done and useful:
http://blogs.rediff.com/mkbhadrakumar/2012/05/03/the-eagle-has-landed-in-central-asia/
as well as this one, a good companion to the previous:
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5756
MAP: Two proposed pipelines: TAPI (which includes TAP in green) and IPI:
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/05/~/media/Images/Reports/2008/bg2139_map1sm/bg2139_map1.ashx
On a related note, the UAE declared its intention to increase its contribution to global energy supplies in the case of disruption due to conflict:
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-1.asp?xfile=data/uaebusiness/2012/May/uaebusiness_May71.xml§ion=uaebusiness
On Afghanistan, Anthony Cordesman (Center for Strategic and International Studies): May 1, 2012
http://csis.org/publication/time-focus-afghan-good-enough
This piece in Armed Forces Journal is an interesting read but the author, Collins, is on the one hand unclear about what he means by "stay the course," as he does not overtly disapprove of the current plans for the next 2 and 10 year periods. On the other hand, he offers a rather specific plan with his 15:20 suggestion that NATO maintain 15, 000 troops and a commitment of $20 billion for further Afghan stabilization.
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2012/04/9951800
and the Washington Times on Iran in US contingency plans
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/may/1/iran-is-top-contingency-in-whittled-us-war-plans/?page=1
and referencing the above,
http://www.nti.rsvp1.com/gsn/article/updated-us-conflict-preparations-focus-iran/?mgh=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nti.org&mgf=1
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Further commentary.......Bringing it all together....coming soon.........
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