Political & Military Realities in Afghanistan: Two Readings Recommended

The New York Times asks, "Is There a Romney Doctrine?" and proceeds to document the impossibility of arriving at an answer at this point in time.  The article is based largely on unattributed interviews, due to clear statements from the staffers that they would face punitive measures if their participation in the interviews were known (as would be the case in any presidential campaign).  The crux of that and of the article can be found in this excerpt:

'Another adviser, saying he would be “cashiered” if the campaign caught him talking to a reporter without approval, said the real answer was that “Romney doesn’t want to really engage these issues until he is in office”."

Perhaps Mr. Romney figures he'll have more "flexibility" after the election.

In the meantime, most discussion of foreign policy in the popular media reflects the broader ideological landscape of this election, in which each side distorts the views and record of the other side, and knee-jerks itself into automatic reactions to  anything associated with political opponents.  As most everyone acknowledges, even while perpetuating the behavior, the stakes associated with discussing much of foreign policy on the campaign trail are higher than the long-term domestic priorities such as the economy and social services.  The president's use of the raid against bin Laden to promote his candidacy is at the same time questionable in taste and entirely defensible given the opposition's insistence that the president run for re-election on his record.  Of course, they would prefer to focus on less successful aspects of his record, but once the door is open, the consequences are entirely predictable.  In any case, the touting of the bin Laden assassination can backfire for the incumbent, especially with independent voters.  Also, Romney's criticism of President Obama's trip to Afghanistan recently was roundly criticized by all sides, both for symbolic reasons (criticizing the President while he is out of the country) and substantive (the delicate status of the entire Afghanistan situation).  There's little doubt such things will continue, which is par for the democratic course, but are also consequential in the real world beyond campaigning.

It will be interesting to see how Afghanistan is treated in the remainder of the election season given the rapid transitions underway.  There are many aspects that can be subject to political manipulation

 I would like to offer two works that provide proper background and perspective.   The first is a widely respected RAND Corporation document called Afghan Peace Talks: A Primer. Fair warning, it's about 120 pages of text, but contains valuable insight on the current and possible future of efforts to end the war and to pursue U.S. interests through other means.  The very phrase, "peace talks with the Taleban" can be used as a political tool most easily, with charges of appeasement and other misapplied historical lessons.  Understanding reality, as usual, is difficult in the soundbite world of political campaigns, but is vital if we are going to be an informed nation debating a policy in which we have invested so much.  In this publication from the National Defense University, the reader will find very important historical developments that explain how the Taleban arrived at their current status, in which they exercise some political and judicial powers though largely lacking the political legitimacy they seek.  The article can be found here.  It was in 2003 that the Taleban augmented their militant insurgency with a "soft power" type strategy. I cannot help but conclude that the diversion of U.S. attention from Afghanistan to Iraq at this time contributed to the Taleban's limited success in its endeavors.  It is difficult to not wonder what a sustained all out offensive in Afghanistan could have accomplished without the diversion of resources and attention to Iraq.

Because U.S. strategy for Afghanistan is to a large degree dependent on success in the effort to regionalize the problem.  It is difficult to discuss such a complex strategy when the politics of the Central Asian region are very delicate and by no means settled.  Negotiations on pipeline and railroad routes, for example, require the satisfaction of some interests (for example, as a means of tying Afghanistan to the region in a productive, non-narcotic manner) and will result (purposefully in these cases) in the dissatisfaction of others (how might Iran, Russia and China react?).  See my earlier posts for more on this strategy, to which I'll return soon.