Let us not forget that the fundamental theory of chaos is one of consequences -- the butterfly effect, as is often cited. Slight variations in initial conditions lead to widely varying and non-linear effects over time. The introduction of chaos theory (and in particular deterministic chaos theory) into social sciences has had mixed results, as succinctly summarized here. Its application to policy making is difficult as well, because unlike in its use in mathematics and physical sciences, chaos theory cannot specify which initial social-political condition will have precisely what effects. However, ultimately chaos theory is about the search for order and provides us with a general path along which we can focus our attention on finding order within disorder and on tracing the multiple and non-linear strands of causes and effects.
So let's look at Egypt and the events of the past few days. We need more answers. Many many more answers. I finally succumbed and signed up for a Twitter account (@GrangerGreg). My first tweet was an expression of condolence for the family of our slain foreign service officers and military support staff. My second was a reply in the form of a question to the State Department, which is putting out multiple tweets denying any validity or justification for the violence in both Egypt and Libya. My question was based on what I have to call rumors as I cannot independently confirm; it has been alleged that the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Anne Patterson, forbade Marines whose duty it is to protect the Embassy from carrying live ammunition. I want to reiterate that this has been mentioned and repeated in a few online blogs, and that repeating an allegation does not make it true. If it is true, the Ambassador should be recalled to Washington and possibly removed from her position. There are other factors that are beyond the Ambassador's control -- such as a Diplomatic Security Service that is stretched too thin and long-standing disagreements between security personnel and State public affairs officers over the need for and images created by high levels of security. And of course direct responsibility for any insecurity, damage, and loss of life belongs to the perpetrators, be they religious fanatics, football hooligans or willingly manipulated unemployed youths, as seems to be the composition of the Egyptian protestors. But if the no-live-ammo allegation is true, and especially if it can be shown that this directly constrained the ability to protect the Embassy and its personnel in Cairo, then there must be accountability. The effects of one policy change, regardless of intent, are potentially very strongly felt, particularly in the context of a country in revolution.
More broadly, there are serious questions about the Egyptian government that require answers. The history of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has clearly not prepared the group for governance, and yet this is the most highly organized body in Egyptian civil society so all others would likely be even worse. The problem as I see it, however, is that stable governance that respects human rights in Egypt is entirely possible, but only through pragmatism. The elected government in power, however, cannot find the appropriate balance between ideology and practicality -- and unfortunately it seems to be the ideological side of the equation that's dominant.
There are calls for cutting off U.S. aid to Egypt, and I understand the sentiment. I would caution, first, against conflating Libya and Egypt. It appears that the Libyan government is helping the United States and the vast majority of Libyans want to be on the side of the United States. Focusing on Egypt, the answer may not be to simply cut off all aid. We need more information about the military side of Egypt's government. We know that the military has taken action against Islamist militants in the Sinai -- and that the President reacted by firing the military leadership. The United States has faced similar dilemmas before: We preach democracy, including civilian governance and respect for human rights, however, we have often sided with military juntas, elevating stability over democracy. It's Realpolitik, and should always be controversial, even if taking such an amoral stance leads to the right outcomes. In the age of instant communications and global media, what is different from the past is that should we adopt the Egyptian military as our principal client and support an advancement of their role in decision-making and governance, and then there arises news of military abuses of civil society, the blowback could be tremendous in a country of 80 million. The Egyptian populace's view of the United States seems to be a far cry from that of the Libyans' affection for Americans. In a phone call with President Morsi yesterday, President Obama was told that the U.S. Embassy will receive necessary security cooperation. There is much room for skepticism. If the elected government does not stabilize the situation, there is increased likelihood that the military will attempt to do so. The decision of the United States to support one or the other could make the difference and improve the situation, but in any case there will be unintended consequences to manage and attempts at blowback to rollback, possibly with force -- and another air war is unlikely to do the trick.
I have defended President Obama's method of waging war against al Qaeda. The terrorist organization has transformed significantly into a network of proliferating organizations and in many cases into leaderless small group or single-individual operations. I have ongoing research into how the idea of chaoplexic warfare, which combines elements of chaos theory and complexity science, is useful in understanding these developments. The president's heightened reliance on drone warfare, Special Operations Forces, and local anti-jihadist fighters in Africa is the right mix, though success is difficult to measure and many challenges persist. The fact that groups such as AQIM, AQAP, al-Shabab that represented the key nodes in a growing networked al Qaeda, are themselves unable to effectively control offshoots from their organizations illustrates that the terrorist group will continue to change and that U.S. policies are contributing to this instability by continually assaulting any attempt at terrorist leadership. I also do not have high expectations for this or any other U.S. president when it comes to controlling events in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere. The vague demands for "American leadership" in these situations fall flat when one tries to figure out just what that means. These are not our revolutions, though they do hold repercussions for our interests. But the notion that President Obama (or President Romney) can somehow exercise leadership over foreign populations in a time of revolution is absurd, and many informed commentaries on Egypt suggest that the Egyptian tendency toward conspiracy theories makes it even less likely that this nation in chaos will see any reason to follow the leadership of an outsider (when they can't even figure out leadership in country). This does not mean the United States cannot shape some events, and we can certainly create conditions that offer incentives and disincentives for Egyptians to consider -- the threat to financial assistance and the arrival of U.S. warships and Marines are good examples. If Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood can cooperate internationally, can convince at least the less fanatical protestors that their concerns will be addressed, and can work with its military to marginalize religious fanatics, we could see a quietening over the next week or so. If not, we will either see larger and more violent protests and/or a larger and more aggressive military stabilization policy. The United States cannot deterministically engineer the outcomes, but with the right mix of initial conditions, we can increase the probability of favorable outcomes.
I have not received a reply to my State Department tweet.
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