The isolation of Iran continues to intensify. Hamas takes a step toward clearing the air for those who, over the past year or so, have been concerned about closer ties between Iran and Hamas in spite of the Shi'ite-Sunni divide. Now, however, with Israel-Iran tensions on the uptick, Hamas announced that they will not ally with Iran in the case of war. See reports here, here and here. Elliot Abrams comments for the Council on Foreign Relations here. Abrams also discusses the Lebanese finding their voice against Syria's Assad.
Meanwhile thousands of Syrians are escaping to Lebanon. This is not endearing Syria to the Lebanese, and challenges the governing capacity of Hezbollah (40,000 rockets aren't very helpful in refugee crises), raising questions of the latter's allegiance to Iran in the case of war with Israel as a matter of practicality. Additionally, Hezbollah is increasingly reliant on criminal activities for funding, as support from Iran tends to fluctuate with the price of oil and with spikes in instability in Iran and Syria. Foreign Affairs offers a good summary here (the author is Matthew Levitt; this column can be found on CNN's Fareed Zakaria's site also).
Studies of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have shown that the group's increasing reliance on criminal activities -- or its addiction to it, given the tens of millions of dollars crime is bringing in to AQIM, and similar amounts to Hezbollah as well -- raises questions about its allegiance to the religious nature of their commitment to Al Qaeda. It's not uncommon to read analysts ask if AQIM is an Islamist terrorist organization funded by crime, or a criminal organization that carries out terrorist attacks. The relevance here is to ask what effect a similar path will mean for Hezbollah, an organization whose reach is global compared to AQIM's wanderings and plundering around the Sahel. Much of Hezbollah's global network is criminal, not theocratic. The need to maintain those connections and keep the money flowing can affect Hezbollah's calculation of risk and benefit, especially in strategic decisions such as becoming party to an Israel-Iran war. In short, pragmatism may overcome Islamism to some degree.
I'm not at all talking about an end to conflict, including the potential for armed conflict, between Hezbollah and Israel. I am saying that it's possible that Hezbollah will simply sit this one out, hoping that Israel and/or the United States can strike and go, and that Iran will lick its wounds, hope for greater domestic unity against the evil interlopers, and go about rebuilding its drive for power again.
The last time oil reached triple digits, even to $145 per barrel in July 2008, Iran was able to double its financial support of Hezbollah, to $200 million. But the time between that spike and the current one saw prices dip as low as $60 per barrel, an Iranian protest movement take a stand, civil war in Syria, and the return of triple digit oil prices. However, also in the meantime American and international sanctions have changed the dynamics of Iranian financial support for offshore armed operations.
So where is this heading? It is not looking good for Iran, no longer able to count on Syria, Hamas and even Hezbollah as brothers in arms, though there is no certainty of how deep these rifts may go. The USS Enterprise arrives in the Persian Gulf this month, joining two other carrier groups led by the USS Carl Vinson and the USS Abraham Lincoln. This is the first time I know of that the United States has deployed three carrier groups in the Gulf without one being scheduled to rotate out of the area. The results of recent elections giving Ayatollah Khameini a strengthened hand in the Majlis, or parliament, spells trouble for President Ahmadinejad in that long simmering power contest, and a small positive nudge in the right direction on the nuclear front. However, we should not lose sight of the degree to which the Iranian people support progress in nuclear research, and this includes what is known about many in movements opposing the regime. There are many cross-cutting fault lines that will likely continue to fracture the internal and international sovereignty of the Islamic Republic. The results could include desperate moves and miscalculations, and not necessarily by the Iranian policymakers alone. But with the stakes so high given the fragile global economic system and the lives of 79 million Iranians, perhaps change can be managed without catastrophe....What are the chances?
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