Saturday, November 10, 2012

DroneWars

Focusing the lens a bit tighter after the broad topics of the last blog, there are many options for analysis. One that stands out for the combination of strategic, operational and ethical questions it raises can be summed up with the word "drones."  Let's take them up each in turn, that is, the strategic, the operational, and the ethical.

In the two hours or so since I wrote that first paragraph, I became informed of a new development. On November 7th, the day after the U.S. presidential election, drone strikes killed al Qaeda operatives (names) in Yemen, X miles from the capital. Here is Bill Roggio from Long War Journal:

The strike was certainly carried out by the US-operated Predators or Reapers. US military and intelligence officials have repeatedly told The Long War Journal that the Yemeni air force does not have the ability to hit moving targets in a nighttime strike. And in early October, Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi admitted that the nighttime strikes were carried out by the US "because the Yemeni Air Force cannot carry out missions at night."

Adnan al Qadhi, an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula commander who operates in Sana'a, and two of his bodyguards, Rabiee Lahib and Radwan al Hashidi, were confirmed to have been killed in the strike, Yemeni officials said. Al Qadhi's family told Abdul Razzaq al Jamal, a Yemeni journalist who is closely linked to AQAP, that Qadhi and the two bodyguards were killed in the airstrike.

Al Qadhi is "a former jihadist fighter in Afghanistan and al Qaeda member" who is wanted for the Sept. 17, 2008 complex attack on the US Embassy in Sana'a, according to AFP. More than 16 people were killed after terrorists detonated multiple bombs and then launched a ground attack in an attempt to breach the compound. Al Qaeda also deployed snipers dressed in Yemeni military uniforms during the attack.

Last night's strike is the first recorded in Sana'a since the US stepped up air and missile attacks against terrorist operatives in 2009. The US is expanding its use of drones against AQAP in Yemen; prior strikes have focused on the network in southern Yemen. But the previous strike, on Oct. 28, took place in Saada in northern Yemen. Four AQAP fighters, including two Saudis, were killed in the attack that targeted a compound of a wanted al Qaeda commander."

Read more: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/11/us_drone_strike_near.php#ixzz2BqtheMAM 
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This could go a long way to explaining the timing of Gen. (ret.) Petraeus's exit from the CIA. I'll be posting more on the topic of drones over the weekend.
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a Reuters blog offers further insight and questions for thought; here's a snip:

So far, U.S. drone strikes appear to be keeping the Haqqanis under pressure, making it harder for the group – limited to a small number at the top – to travel, operate and communicate. Efforts to squeeze the Haqqanis’ business interests would complement this; but given the difficulty of the task, would not alone be a substitute. “The small and centralized nature of the decision-making process and fund distribution network could be a major vulnerability for the Haqqanis, suggesting the possibility that the killing or capture of key senior figures, in particular those who handle financial matters and supplies, might significantly degrade overall network capacity.”

So the question is really not whether drone strikes are right or wrong; or indeed in the interminable debates of exactly how many civilian casualties they cause (without free access to FATA we don’t know for sure; we know only that they have the precision capability to cause fewer  casualties than other weapons), but what are opponents of drones offering as an alternative?
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That last paragraph is provocative, but offers a false choice. We can discuss the rightness/wrongness of the policy while still searching for alternatives. One thing I assume is that it can't go on forever. Which brings up the strategic question -- how will we know when it's time to cut back or stop the drone attacks? Or is it a matter of shifting the bases geographically more so than ending the attacks, following the al Qaeda nodes as the network transforms further.

3 comments:

  1. There is no doubt that drones are more effective than the mafia in getting rid of undesirable persons. I'm sure Castro would not be alive if drones had been around 50 years ago. In fact its effectiveness is what makes it so tempting but also morally dangerous.
    Let me fall back on Kant's categorical imperative and postulate that any and all had the same capabilities. Suppose for example Spain took the same line against ETA terrorists as we do against Al Qaida and could justify attacks against them anywhere any time. An ETA leader is holed up somewhere in Brooklyn and you can kill him, although there may be some 'collateral damage' but these potential victims are not Spanish, so they do it, killing a few unfortunate Brooklynites. What would our governments reaction be?
    Of course we do it because we know the governments in Pakistan and Yemen not only don't really mind, in fact secretly welcome it, since they feel threatened by the terrorists.
    My question is whether America is breaking some international law with these drones, not that we recognize international law.
    The other issue is that 'eye for an eye, tooth for tooth' is very alive in that part of the world (in US too) and does this all not beget more violence?
    Looking at America from the outside I think there are few things that irk foreigners about us more than our 'exceptionalism.' In that regard we are like Israel, the difference is that they think they are God's chosen people and we think we are history's chosen people.
    For some reason this is listed as Helen's comment and I can't change it. Oh well, if the thought police viewed the above statements as anti-American, they will spy on her and I'll be safe.

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  2. The United States does recognize international law, everyday, far more frequently than we violate it. The problem is that the areas of violation are the areas in which people suffer and die as a consequence. I think technology does drive this somewhat, shifting the question from whether the damage done by drones is acceptable to whether the damage done by drones is more acceptable than a ground invasion or extensive strategic bombing. Terrorism is transnational; sovereign state boundaries mean no more than a logistical obstacle. Countering terrorism must then by necessity also be transnational, unhampered by reliance on lesser states' bureaucracies to approve operations. And, besides, as you point out we have tacit approval from the host governments, or ways to secure post hoc approval.

    That leaves the effectiveness question. Is the drone policy accomplishing goals, and if so, at what cost? Do the long term costs outweigh the short term gains? Do the answers to these questions vary from Pakistan to Yemen to Africa?

    As for your hypothetical, drone technology is proliferating rapidly around the world. We may get an answer.

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  3. Frank, I believe this essay says a great deal of what you're getting at. http://jurist.org/hotline/2012/11/samar-warsi-drone-policy.php

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