Imperialism: The Highest Form of State Capitalism?

Regarding Africa, I expect two things between the US and China. Right now China is investing $$$ in Africa but trying to avoid military entanglements (same for China in Middle East). The US is investing in mostly military alliances (not in the NATO sense but more like fluid, short-term and shifting alliances) that's working very well against al-Shabab in Somalia. We're engaging in some "capacity building" as well (water, clinics, etc) but I expect that we'll have to advance investment in bigger projects and China will find itself drawn into local conflicts to protect its interests.

The title of this post is taken from Vladimir's Lenin's famous treatise, "Imperialism: The Highest Form of Capitalism," in which he offers the Bolshevik perspective on WW I. It's often compared with John Hobson's work on empire, also from the early 20th century.  State Capitalism is a characterization of the Chinese business model. The name is self-explanatory, the question is whether it is sustainable against global free market forces and domestic turmoil should the model begin to lag in implementation. 

Here is a very useful map of Africa illustrating Chinese investments on the continent. The map was published in August 2012 in Business Insider.

In this online publication from Zimbabwe, issue is taken with a recent book that praised China as an investment partner for Africa. It's an illustrative case of the broader, global puzzle into which this debate fits. This portion is telling:

China’s opaque business dealings with dictatorships reveal that it is not interested in the development of the country and communities where it operates from, hence it pays little regard to business ethics, transparency and accountability.

While the Chinese played an important role in the decolonisation process on the African continent, and Zimbabwe in particular, I’m afraid its involvement in the country now is retrogressive as it is only concerned with extraction, not development. While failing to promote development in Africa, China has however successfully helped to prop up repressive regimes which are mortgaging their resources to it.
********************************************************************************* 
It's difficult to not observe China's behavior and not associate it with long-standing notions of neo-imperialism.  The goal is wholly material and not in the least social:  deals are made for the extraction of vital natural resources, with socio-political concerns not part of the equation. Even assuming China remains disengaged from direct involvement in political and military affairs in Zimbabwe and elsewhere, there are consequences to not acting and there are consequences to the development that is taking place. The Zimbabwean quoted above notwithstanding, consider the long-term effects of China's investments in universities.  First, there is the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.  Just on the opening page of FOCAC's webpage are a few new headlines that exemplify where I'm going with this:

Congo borrowing $1.1 billion USD from China
Chinese firms set up railway technology training center in Nigeria
Africa becomes largest Chinese medicine export market

At this past summer's FOCAC meeting, President Hu Jintao himself announced new levels of Chinese support for training and education in Africa, as summarized here (quoted below); the full text of the speech is here


“China will implement the African Talents Programme to train 30,000 personnel in various sectors, offer 18,000 government scholarships and build cultural and vocational training facilities....China will continue to implement the China-Africa Joint Research and Exchange Plan to sponsor 100 programmes for research, exchange and cooperation by academic institutions and scholars of the two sides."

“China and Africa should increase cultural and people-to-people exchanges and encourage exchanges and interactions between the two sides in education, culture, science and technology, health, sports and tourism.”

Hu Jintao said China had trained close to 40,000 Africans in various sectors and provided more than 20,000 government scholarships to people in African countries.

“China and Africa have set up 29 Confucius Institutes in 22 African countries. Twenty pairs of leading Chinese and African universities have entered into cooperation under the 20+20 Cooperation Plan for Chinese and African Institutions of Higher Education,” he added.

*******************************************************************************
Have a look at the Confucius Institutes referenced above here.

These exercises in soft power will not necessarily spare China from entanglement in African political affairs. As China is learning at home, education, skills, and jobs lead to public expectations that these qualities of life will continue, and that they will pay off benefits beyond the family throughout civil society. Evolving public expectations often challenge the prevailing social order; we can look to the Arab Spring and to the 100,000 annual protests in China itself for ideas of what can come next.

More immediately, even the extent of contact China has established in Africa has brought out tensions, which the United States sees as opportunities. Some examples are cited in this Christian Science Monitor article covering Secretary Clinton's August trip to Africa this past August.

This report by the Congressional Research Service from June, 2012, contains much useful information.  A textbox within the report contains this summary:

Comparing Chinese and U.S. Trade with Africa

The value of total trade between China and Africa stood at $8.9 billion in the year 2000. In 2009, Chinese-African trade, totaling $70.4 billion, surpassed that of U.S.-Africa trade ($62 billion), and reached $127.3 billion in 2011, an increase of 1,423% over the 2000 level.25 Africa’s share of global Chinese trade also grew over the past decade, from 1.9% of Chinese global trade in 2000 to 3.5% of China’s global trade in 2011. China is also Africa’s largest single source of imports, while the United States is its largest export destination. In 2011, about 62% of African exports to China consisted of crude oil (over $24.77 billion of which came from Angola, the source of over 9% of China’s oil imports in 2011). Another 34% was made up of raw materials, mostly metal commodities and wood. Oil also dominates Africa’s exports to the United States; crude oil made up about 75% of U.S. imports from Africa in 2011. Both China and the United States export a highly diverse, variable array of products to Africa, notably equipment, machinery, vehicles, and other technology. U.S.-African trade has also grown over the past decade, but not as rapidly as Sino-African trade.
******************************************************************************
It's a rather remarkable stat -- 1,423% in 11 years. The as yet unsaid factor in this neo-colonial race through Africa is the difference between the American model of foreign direct investment and the Chinese model, bringing us back to state capitalism, and a topic far too broad for this blog post.

I started this post on US/PRC/AFRICA as a corollary to another piece on US drone policy in Africa and elsewhere. The United States has worked to expand economic ties with Africa beyond the trade that has been dominated by three African countries, Nigeria, Angola and South Africa. In the short-term, China has advantages in its ability to centrally direct the negotiation, direction, and scale of investment projects in Africa whereas the United States is limited in this regard, able to shape the environment for private investments more so than dictate such activities.  The activities that the U.S. Government does directly dictate are in the security sector, for example the counter-terrorism framework established through the CIA, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), and various combined joint task forces working with the African Union and African governments.

At this point, we're left with questions, the answers to which will determine much of what happens geopolitically for decades to come:

What mix of hard power and soft power brings the right results? What concerns about the people of Africa and the governments they live under should constrain positions in trade and investment negotiations? If an "African Spring" should emerge, how will this affect the outside powers and their interests? What are the long term consequences of the United States and a globalizing China competing for access  to natural resources? Will this turn into a competition for the political allegiances of African leaders?

DroneWars

Focusing the lens a bit tighter after the broad topics of the last blog, there are many options for analysis. One that stands out for the combination of strategic, operational and ethical questions it raises can be summed up with the word "drones."  Let's take them up each in turn, that is, the strategic, the operational, and the ethical.

In the two hours or so since I wrote that first paragraph, I became informed of a new development. On November 7th, the day after the U.S. presidential election, drone strikes killed al Qaeda operatives (names) in Yemen, X miles from the capital. Here is Bill Roggio from Long War Journal:

The strike was certainly carried out by the US-operated Predators or Reapers. US military and intelligence officials have repeatedly told The Long War Journal that the Yemeni air force does not have the ability to hit moving targets in a nighttime strike. And in early October, Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi admitted that the nighttime strikes were carried out by the US "because the Yemeni Air Force cannot carry out missions at night."

Adnan al Qadhi, an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula commander who operates in Sana'a, and two of his bodyguards, Rabiee Lahib and Radwan al Hashidi, were confirmed to have been killed in the strike, Yemeni officials said. Al Qadhi's family told Abdul Razzaq al Jamal, a Yemeni journalist who is closely linked to AQAP, that Qadhi and the two bodyguards were killed in the airstrike.

Al Qadhi is "a former jihadist fighter in Afghanistan and al Qaeda member" who is wanted for the Sept. 17, 2008 complex attack on the US Embassy in Sana'a, according to AFP. More than 16 people were killed after terrorists detonated multiple bombs and then launched a ground attack in an attempt to breach the compound. Al Qaeda also deployed snipers dressed in Yemeni military uniforms during the attack.

Last night's strike is the first recorded in Sana'a since the US stepped up air and missile attacks against terrorist operatives in 2009. The US is expanding its use of drones against AQAP in Yemen; prior strikes have focused on the network in southern Yemen. But the previous strike, on Oct. 28, took place in Saada in northern Yemen. Four AQAP fighters, including two Saudis, were killed in the attack that targeted a compound of a wanted al Qaeda commander."

Read more: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/11/us_drone_strike_near.php#ixzz2BqtheMAM 
*******************************************************************************

This could go a long way to explaining the timing of Gen. (ret.) Petraeus's exit from the CIA. I'll be posting more on the topic of drones over the weekend.
****************
a Reuters blog offers further insight and questions for thought; here's a snip:

So far, U.S. drone strikes appear to be keeping the Haqqanis under pressure, making it harder for the group – limited to a small number at the top – to travel, operate and communicate. Efforts to squeeze the Haqqanis’ business interests would complement this; but given the difficulty of the task, would not alone be a substitute. “The small and centralized nature of the decision-making process and fund distribution network could be a major vulnerability for the Haqqanis, suggesting the possibility that the killing or capture of key senior figures, in particular those who handle financial matters and supplies, might significantly degrade overall network capacity.”

So the question is really not whether drone strikes are right or wrong; or indeed in the interminable debates of exactly how many civilian casualties they cause (without free access to FATA we don’t know for sure; we know only that they have the precision capability to cause fewer  casualties than other weapons), but what are opponents of drones offering as an alternative?
****************************************************************************

That last paragraph is provocative, but offers a false choice. We can discuss the rightness/wrongness of the policy while still searching for alternatives. One thing I assume is that it can't go on forever. Which brings up the strategic question -- how will we know when it's time to cut back or stop the drone attacks? Or is it a matter of shifting the bases geographically more so than ending the attacks, following the al Qaeda nodes as the network transforms further.

Post-Post Election Post

Having been swamped by too many freshman class papers to comprehend and a determination to avoid politics on Facebook, I also stepped away from blogging.  I want to thank Joe Cunningham for allowing me to share my bloggy thoughts on his site, and for his patience while I worked out my assessment of where the 2012 election is leading the United States in the realm of world affairs.

First, a recap of my thoughts on the two major party candidates per foreign policy questions.

• Because I believe the "real" Mitt Romney is "Moderate Mitt" and not "Severely Conservative Mitt," I always thought there were more similarities than differences in the world affairs views of the two candidates. This was proven during the debate on foreign policy in which Romney agreed with Obama's policies on a variety of substantive matters. The natural inclination in contemporary American politics seems to be to find fault with this, rather than take a positive view and find what can be built upon consensus.
• The issue that stood out for me per Romney was China. I feel quite strongly that, had he been elected, Mr. Romney would have spent Day Two of his administration explaining why he did not formally declare China to be a "currency manipulator" on Day One as he repeatedly promised. If this would have turned out to be inaccurate and the declaration issued, the effects would be both short-term (in the sovereign wealth and debt departments) and long-term (combining with ongoing and emerging areas of tension between China and the U.S. to make difficult the management of the most important international relationship for the 21st century. Romney).
• My view of the Obama Administration's management of U.S. foreign policy has been favorable, with strong positives far outweighing the complaints I hear. The Benghazi episode I liken to the 1982 attack on American Marines in Lebanon, an unfortunate event in a location of instability. However, unlike the history of Lebanon since 1982, the overall picture in Libya is encouraging, though with plenty to worry about as well.  The people's turn against the terrorists after the Benghazi attack proves (1) the Libyans are on our side against al Qaeda-related terrorist groups, and (2) they desire to take control and exercise responsibility over their own security challenges. By definition, unexpected crises can return with little specific warnings to dominate our attention, but the signs in Libya are more encouraging than they are discouraging.  Elsewhere, I agree that it is time for the Afghans and Iraqis to take responsibility for their own countries, ignoring for the moment that I don't really consider either to be a country, but highly fragile collections of people forced within common boundaries whose borders were drawn by outsiders with their own national interests to propagate.  The turnaround of Myanmar in both its foreign and domestic politics has been remarkable and significant as part of the administration's defense strategy of "pivoting" or "rebalancing" U.S. attention and resources toward Asia.  Because of the nature of Asian geopolitics, we learned long ago that multilateral alliance building does not work. Therefore, working bilaterally with Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, Australia and others, the administration has cultivated the beginnings of an effective military alliance network to counter the rise of China in the region. In the Persian Gulf, the Iranian-Israeli tensions are often highlighted at the expense of another factor, i.e., Iran's relations with its Arab neighbors, of which only Syria is on friendly terms and Syria is imploding with the help of its Persian, Turk and Arab neighbors. As covered in an earlier post here, the tensions between the United Arab Emirates and Iran are in increasingly heated over the islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunbs and Lesser Tunbs, located very near the Strait of Hormuz.  The U.S. has increased arms sales in the region, particularly in the area of missile defense with most going to Saudi Arabia and UAE.  Diplomatically, the Gulf Cooperation Council, which has never been more than a loosely organized collection of Gulf Arab states is still by no means as institutionalized as NATO or such long standing groups but is more cohesive and focused on a common problem than ever.  Many are facing domestic troubles and are presenting the West with a dilemma it's faced before, between supporting a strategically important ally and supporting the domestic opposition to the regime's policies and human rights records.  The situation in Bahrain, propped up by Saudi Arabia against a Shi'ite uprising, is a case in point.
• In sum, President Obama has practiced a pragmatic form of Realism or Realpolitik, aka power politics in which one cautiously determines policy based on considerations of power more so than of values such as democracy promotion.  His reputation as a Machiavellian political figure would also lend support to this characterization.  This is not to say concern for democracy and human rights is absent from the agenda, but as with the Realpolitik of Nixon/Kissinger, support for human rights is often a strategic move designed to enhance one's power position. From his early call for snipers to take out Somali pirates through his further advancement, by a large measure, of America's traditional disregard for the sovereignty of foreign states when the sovereignty or security of the United States is perceived to be at risk, Obama has demonstrated he is no idealist.  His policy toward Israel is classic Realism, for example following one of the great Hans "father of modern realism" Morgenthau's principles of international relations -- that big powers do not do the bidding of lesser powers. Obama may not have the best relationship with Prime Minister Netanyahu, but that may not be an entirely negative thing, and more importantly the relationship between the nations is much more than the relationship between specific governing officials at any given time.  And, finally, Obama's foreign policy has fully realized the importance of understanding new forms of warfare, including terrorism and cyberwar. We are witnessing hard fought but real successes in Somalia, Uganda, and Kenya, as well as progressing the effort against AQIM in Mali now that ECOWAS will be sending in stabilization forces.
• As stated (and used blatantly and proudly by the Obama team), Mr. Romney agreed with the general trajectory and sometimes specific policies of much of Obama's foreign policy. Which leaves the question as to why I would oppose Romney so strongly on foreign policy grounds.
1. Neo-Conservatism. The fact that Romney chose to seek the formal participation in his campaign by the likes of John Bolton was a giant red flag. The track record of these people is abysmal. They are blinded by ideology and do not get that the proper participation in global power politics is to know not only the extent but also the limits of one's power at any given time. More importantly their idealism regarding the ability of the United States to transplant democracy anywhere in the world regardless of local history and culture is dangerous, potentially leading us not into a possible limited, targeted strike on Iran, but a full blown invasion, occupation, regime change and democratization. Beware liberal imperialists is a byword with me. 
2. Great Power Politics. Romney did nothing to convince me to believe he understands the nuance required in relations with countries like China and Russia. The Russians did not follow the U.S. election very closely, reportedly because many felt that U.S.-Russian relations would not change with either candidate winning.  Frankly, I could not get a good read on Romney's strategic thinking about Russia, as I downplay the significance of gaffes from his campaign about the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia that made occasional headlines.  Romney's statement about Russia being America's #1 geopolitical foe is hardly enough to go on, though it raises valid questions about his judgment (and I'm one who found the statement not entirely unreasonable because, indeed, we do and will have geopolitical rivalries against the Russians). Obama also made numerous rookie mistakes, such as with the silly "reset" button presented to Putin.
   But, generally, American policy on Russia would be a bit ambiguous regardless of who is president, because either would have to deal with Putin's mercurial attitude, and with the fact that domestically Putin is facing a rising tide of trouble. The U.S. under Obama has worked effectively with the Central Asian states, who are determined to remain independent in spite of the American-Russian-Chinese rivalry for their allegiance and resources.  On China, as mentioned earlier, I never understand why candidates lock themselves into a self-spun web by pronouncing some bold action "on day one," whether it was to close Gitmo or to formally designate China a currency manipulator.  Regardless, to pronounce such a policy without conditions or stated support for diplomatic maneuvering prior to such a drastic step was not wise in my view. More generally regarding China, Romney seemed to think China's government would change its behavior simply because a President Romney would insist upon it. This shows a troubling idealism or delusion about how international relations work, especially between great powers.  Obama's pivot to Asia, while not without its resource constraints even as we exit Iraq and Afghanistan, has taken the form of about a half-dozen vital bilateral relationships that together form a network of allies countering Chinese claims to disputed territories and control of sea lanes. These type of issues are far too obscure (unfortunately) from the American public's view to be debated in our electoral campaigns, therefore we have to go by what we do hear, and, again, nothing I heard from the Romney camp convinced me he had the temperament, judgment and independent mind for leadership on this level.
3. Middle Powers....There was little mention of Brazil or India, so honestly here I'm talking mostly about Israel again. I oppose many Israeli policies but I also understand their position and have no problem with the U.S. allying with Israel. But it seems to me many people have skewed ideas about how international alliances work. There is too much analogizing to personal relationships, constantly referring to the Israelis as friends rather than allies (and there never seems to be any question of how Israel treats the United States, only the other way around).  Also, as I mentioned earlier, there is apparent confusion as to how superpowers are to conduct themselves in relations with lesser powers. I am not recommending a policy of disdain or condescension, but I am saying that American policy must be based on American interests, and Israel has a separate set of concerns than we do as a global power. I fear that many of the conservative movement allow themselves to go too far in support of Israel, treating Israel as an extension of the United States (or the other way around, even), and advocating a scenario wherein the U.S. follows Israel's lead rather than the other way around. We can replace the name Israel with any other mid-level power in the world and my opinion would be the same -- the bigger player calls the shots. I also do not associate myself with the religiously-driven agenda of some American supporters of Israel, but I have little doubt they would have had greater influence in a Romney administration than in the Obama administration, and I do not find that to be a proper basis for policy. Then there's the oddity of Sherman Adelson, whose agenda for supporting first Gingrich and then Romney included the liberation of Jonathan Pollard from U.S. prison. That's all I needed to know.
4. Terrorism. Here Mr. Romney offered much agreement with the course of actions taken by President Obama, which does little to recommend the need for replacing the incumbent. The progress we've made in Africa -- not completed but definitely progress has been made -- is exemplary of Obama's strategy of using Special Ops Forces and drone technology rather than sledge hammer invasions.
5. To conclude, anyone who is and will be President of the United States for some time to come will be faced with enormous and multi-faceted challenges. I appreciate the Realism-based approach of the Obama administration, which is not to say there no downsides or that all has been perfect. Far from it. But it's a philosophy I find most compelling and productive of international stability. I don't argue that a Romney foreign policy would have been disastrous; indeed, it's apparent many current policies would continue. This is actually more the norm than otherwise, but people seem to have a need to believe that EVERYTHING changes when administrations change, particularly when one party replaces the other in the White House.  Yet there is always a great deal of continuity. In the end, I could not find compelling reasons to support Romney, or to change from the course we are on under Obama onto a Romney course that involves influences I find questionable for American interests and many questions about Romney's own stated positions.

Once again the Jamestown Foundation gives us valuable insight, in this case with a brief but informative study of how the U.S. Presidential election is being covered in China.  See here for article.

Libya & the U.S. - An Opportunistic History and a Historic Opportunity

It is always interesting to see the historical analogies brought forth by politicians and pundits. This week it's been 1979, and not without good cause. That was the last time a U.S. Ambassador was murdered on the job, and of course after President Carter allowed the exiled Shah of Iran into the United States, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was taken over by revolutionaries backed by the new sovereign government, who then held U.S. diplomats hostage for well over a year.  Carter had resisted granting permission for some time in spite of constant pressure from Henry Kissinger, David Rockefeller, John McCloy, Zbigniew Brzezinski and their acolytes. In the end, as the Shah's diagnosis was suspected to be cancer, the President relented and granted entry. A good retelling of the story by one of those taken hostage in Tehran can be found in the online journal American Diplomacy.

The Carter administration's late and failed attempt to rescue the hostage through limited military action was a strong blow against America's global reputation, and helped to seal his defeat in the subsequent election. His opponent, Ronald Reagan, was uncritical of the president after the failed hostage rescue attempt and called for national unity.  Now, the analogies between 1979 and this past week's events in Egypt and Libya have been repeated often (suspending for rhetoric's sake the far reaching differences between the situations in Egypt and Libya).  There are Islamists, an embassy, and a Democrat U.S. president.  For now I will focus on Libya.

I would like to offer an alternative historical analysis, all the while emphasizing that no political analogies are a perfect match to the situations to which they are being compared.  The 1979 takeover of the embassy in Iran did have a specific aspect in common with the 2012 Libyan strike on the U.S. embassy -- both appear to be in direct response to U.S. actions.  In 1979, it was the permission granted for the Shah to enter the United States.  In 2012, there is talk of the Libyan strike being in retaliation for the killing of a top al Qaeda figure, a Libyan, by the United States.  One might be tempted to add the revolutionary contexts in the two countries as another point of commonality. However, the Iranian takeover the embassy was a part of the revolution. In Libya, the United States enjoys widespread support among the Libyan people who, in post-revolution elections, elected a non-Islamist government that is aiding the United States in investigating the attack. It was a strike against the revolution by globalized terrorists, not a part of the revolution.  The situation in Egypt is far less settled even than in Libya. In Egypt, I am not convinced the revolution is over, and this week's events is evidence.  As I said in my previous post, there are many as yet unanswered questions, and I hope we find answers and learn the right lessons.

The politics of the American presidential election have unsurprisingly entered the scene, as each side attempts to frame the questions and control the messages facing the voting public.  The incumbent president has a great deal to answer for, given the confidence with which he planned to help stabilize this volatile region, and his actions over the coming weeks and months will have some impact on the election. The details will determine to what degree this impact is felt. The Romney campaign is trying to paint the Obama administration as weak and misguided, though I have not heard the alternative strategies the Obama administration should have taken.  Should he have protected Ghadafi and Mubarak?  What about the argument that was floated publicly by some conservatives, declaring the Arab Spring a vindication of, or even a result of, President George W. Bush's "freedom agenda"? But in the past 24 hours Gov. Sarah Palin was on television saying that the promotion of democracy in the Middle East and North African regions is an unrealistic proposition.  Conservative talk show host Sean Hannity and Sen. John McCain had a tense discussion in which McCain accurately depicted the situation in Libya while Hannity seemed unable to tell the difference between Egypt and Libya.  So, while important details are needed to answer specific questions about intelligence and embassy security, as a political issue I only seem to get confused as to what it is the president's critics offer as an alternative plan, or even a cogent criticism.

Let's take a look at timeline of instances, rather than just one, extending our perspective from a single historical analogy (the 1979 Iranian revolution) to a chronology of events that, because of Iran's support for Hezbollah, can be seen to be an extension of the Iranian revolution as well as the early developments of the global Islamist terrorism we still face today.  Much importance has often been assigned to the fact that in spite of an agreement to release them earlier, the American hostages were not released by the Iranian revolutionaries until after President Reagan had taken the oath of office.  There will always be debate about the reasons behind these developments, but ultimately it's not a very important point.  What is significant is that Islamist terrorism continued, even accelerated and expanded, over the years following the Iranian revolution, and it's my thesis that we benefit from realizing the historical similarities or connections between the developments of the 1980s and today, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).  First, an abridged summary --

1981 Libyan Air Force learns lesson from challenging USAF

June 1982 Israel invades Lebanon, bombing Beirut

                SecState Haig and then Shulz want US involved in peace process

                SecDef Weinberger and JCS do not want to deploy troops

                Reagan finds middle ground, sends 800 Marines in August 1982

                                PLO fighters leave, U.S. troops withdrawn

                

 September 1982  700 refugees killed by militia with close ties to Israel

                                  US troops ordered back on shore

April 1983 Hezbollah truck bombs US Embassy Beirut, 17 Americans killed, including 8 CIA

                  Attacks continue. Reagan orders shelling of militia camps

October 23, 1983 Marine barracks at Beirut airport bombed – 241 servicemen killed, mostly               Marines.    Over 100 wounded.  More US shelling in response. Baker, Weinberger and JCS want troops removed.

December 12, 1983 US Embassy in Kuwait bombed, 6 killed, 80 injured

February 1984 remaining troops removed from Beirut

Libyan international terrorism continues 1985-6 in Rome, Vienna, Berlin; Reagan drops 60 tons of bombs on Tripoli, Qaddafi lives and two days later 3 U.S. employees of the American University in Beirut are murdered for the state purpose of revenge for the attack on Tripoli. (The history.com link in the preceding sentence is from 1986, just linked for a quick summary. It includes the often reported death of Qaddafi's 15 month old adopted daughter as a result of the American raid. During the 2011 revolution, it was revealed that the now-grown woman was not killed and was never formally adopted by the long time dictator).

1988 Pan Am 103 bombed over Lockerbie, killing 270, including 189 Americans. Qaddafi stayed in power until 2011.

A more global look at acts of terrorism and war from 1979 to 1988 can be found here.

******************************************************************************

So where do we go with this?  Thousands of Libyans fought against us and for al Qaeda in Iraq, and since then many have moved on to Syria and are contributing to the overthrow of Assad with who knows what to come after he's gone.  After losing the revolution at home, a reported 12,000 Libyan fighters carried their weapons to Mali, a country that has seen rising expectations dashed hard on the rocks of tribal and religious warfare.  For decades the Libyan people have suffered under the cloud of the terrorism-sponsoring Qaddafi and now find their homeland and young men subject to non-state terrorism recruitment and a country flooded with arms. 

Where we go is to continue assessing U.S. geopolitical interests in Libya. I believe we are still looking at a historic opportunity to both stabilize Libya, thereby protecting the energy infrastructure and squeezing out another cell of al Qaeda, as well as to assist an incipient democracy take hold. As a principal stakeholder in the geopolitics of the Middle East and North Africa for over fifty years, the United States has inevitably been dragged into the tribal, sectarian, and political-economic struggles of the region.  The targeting of U.S. embassies is not a recently invented tactic, as the abridged summary above illustrates, and I'm only writing about the MENA region, whereas there were attacks on U.S. installations in Europe and Latin America as well.  It's part of being a global power. President Reagan is widely praised for taking action against Libya, but those doing the praising also claim that the bombing of Tripoli silenced Qaddafi, taking Libya out of the terrorist picture. The historical evidence shows otherwise, particularly the 189 Americans killed on Pam Am 103.  Furthermore, throughout the 1980s just as today the Libyan situation has dual qualities: in many ways it stands apart, for example, the current differences between Libya and Egypt, but has also been part and parcel of the broader MENA geopolitical environment. In the 1980s, Americans were killed in Beirut in retaliation for the American bombing of Tripoli.  The US embassies in Beirut and in Kuwait were attacked, and for all of its sincere support of Israel, President Reagan issued harsh words and demands against Prime Minister Begin as Israel's invasion of Lebanon was conducted with a fury that mocked the laws of war.  Reagan's cabinet was heavily divided on the right course of action.  The same dilemmas would plague all subsequent administrations, and will plague the administrations of the near future as well, regardless of partisan control of the White House and of debates over defense spending.

President Obama's handling of the current situation can affect the upcoming election, or at least will be on the minds of his political handlers, just as previous political handlers worried about the effects of policy on voters' decisions.  We all hope stability can be restored without mass destruction. But regardless of the electoral outcome in November, the Commander-in-Chief will have to manage these affairs under conditions we cannot wholly control.

I repeat a theme from my last post: The U.S. government cannot determine which groups will rise and which will fail in foreign cultures, though as in Libya the U.S. can be an important factor in shaping the outcomes.

North Africa -- Chaos and Consequences

Let us not forget that the fundamental theory of chaos is one of consequences -- the butterfly effect, as is often cited.  Slight variations in initial conditions lead to widely varying and non-linear effects over time. The introduction of chaos theory (and in particular deterministic chaos theory) into social sciences has had mixed results, as succinctly summarized here. Its application to policy making is difficult as well, because unlike in its use in mathematics and physical sciences, chaos theory cannot specify which initial social-political condition will have precisely what effects. However, ultimately chaos theory is about the search for order and provides us with a general path along which we can focus our attention on finding order within disorder and on tracing the multiple and non-linear strands of causes and effects.

So let's look at Egypt and the events of the past few days. We need more answers. Many many more answers. I finally succumbed and signed up for a Twitter account (@GrangerGreg). My first tweet was an expression of condolence for the family of our slain foreign service officers and military support staff.  My second was a reply in the form of a question to the State Department, which is putting out multiple tweets denying any validity or justification for the violence in both Egypt and Libya.  My question was based on what I have to call rumors as I cannot independently confirm; it has been alleged that the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Anne Patterson, forbade Marines whose duty it is to protect the Embassy from carrying live ammunition.  I want to reiterate that this has been mentioned and repeated in a few online blogs, and that repeating an allegation does not make it true. If it is true, the Ambassador should be recalled to Washington and possibly removed from her position.  There are other factors that are beyond the Ambassador's control -- such as a Diplomatic Security Service that is stretched too thin and long-standing disagreements between security personnel and State public affairs officers over the need for and images created by high levels of security. And of course direct responsibility for any insecurity, damage, and loss of life belongs to the perpetrators, be they religious fanatics, football hooligans or willingly manipulated unemployed youths, as seems to be the composition of the Egyptian protestors.  But if the no-live-ammo allegation is true, and especially if it can be shown that this directly constrained the ability to protect the Embassy and its personnel in Cairo, then there must be accountability. The effects of one policy change, regardless of intent, are potentially very strongly felt, particularly in the context of a country in revolution.

More broadly, there are serious questions about the Egyptian government that require answers. The history of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has clearly not prepared the group for governance, and yet this is the most highly organized body in Egyptian civil society so all others would likely be even worse.  The problem as I see it, however, is that stable governance that respects human rights in Egypt is entirely possible, but only through pragmatism.  The elected government in power, however, cannot find the appropriate balance between ideology and practicality -- and unfortunately it seems to be the ideological side of the equation that's dominant.

There are calls for cutting off U.S. aid to Egypt, and I understand the sentiment. I would caution, first, against conflating Libya and Egypt. It appears that the Libyan government is helping the United States and the vast majority of Libyans want to be on the side of the United States. Focusing on Egypt, the answer may not be to simply cut off all aid. We need more information about the military side of Egypt's government. We know that the military has taken action against Islamist militants in the Sinai -- and that the President reacted by firing the military leadership. The United States has faced similar dilemmas before: We preach democracy, including civilian governance and respect for human rights, however, we have often sided with military juntas, elevating stability over democracy. It's Realpolitik, and should always be controversial, even if taking such an amoral stance leads to the right outcomes. In the age of instant communications and global media, what is different from the past is that should we adopt the Egyptian military as our principal client and support an advancement of their role in decision-making and governance, and then there arises news of military abuses of civil society, the blowback could be tremendous in a country of 80 million. The Egyptian populace's view of the United States seems to be a far cry from that of the Libyans' affection for Americans.  In a phone call with President Morsi yesterday, President Obama was told that the U.S. Embassy will receive necessary security cooperation.  There is much room for skepticism. If the elected government does not stabilize the situation, there is increased likelihood that the military will attempt to do so. The decision of the United States to support one or the other could make the difference and improve the situation, but in any case there will be unintended consequences to manage and attempts at blowback to rollback, possibly with force -- and another air war is unlikely to do the trick.

I have defended President Obama's method of waging war against al Qaeda.  The terrorist organization has transformed significantly into a network of proliferating organizations and in many cases into leaderless small group or single-individual operations.  I have ongoing research into how the idea of chaoplexic warfare, which combines elements of chaos theory and complexity science, is useful in understanding these developments.  The president's heightened reliance on drone warfare, Special Operations Forces, and local anti-jihadist fighters in Africa is the right mix, though success is difficult to measure and many challenges persist.  The fact that groups such as AQIM, AQAP, al-Shabab that represented the key nodes in a growing networked al Qaeda, are themselves unable to effectively control offshoots from their organizations illustrates that the terrorist group will continue to change and that U.S. policies are contributing to this instability by continually assaulting any attempt at terrorist leadership.  I also do not have high expectations for this or any other U.S. president when it comes to controlling events in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere. The vague demands for "American leadership" in these situations fall flat when one tries to figure out just what that means.  These are not our revolutions, though they do hold repercussions for our interests. But the notion that President Obama (or President Romney) can somehow exercise leadership over foreign populations in a time of revolution is absurd, and many informed commentaries on Egypt suggest that the Egyptian tendency toward conspiracy theories makes it even less likely that this nation in chaos will see any reason to follow the leadership of an outsider (when they can't even figure out leadership in country). This does not mean the United States cannot shape some events, and we can certainly create conditions that offer incentives and disincentives for Egyptians to consider -- the threat to financial assistance and the arrival of U.S. warships and Marines are good examples. If Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood can cooperate internationally, can convince at least the less fanatical protestors that their concerns will be addressed, and can work with its military to marginalize religious fanatics, we could see a quietening over the next week or so.  If not, we will either see larger and more violent protests and/or a larger and more aggressive military stabilization policy.  The United States cannot deterministically engineer the outcomes, but with the right mix of initial conditions, we can increase the probability of favorable outcomes.

I have not received a reply to my State Department tweet.

Links to Helpful Graphs on Consumer Finances and Gas Prices

Handy blogs with helpful graphs. Dig around each site for additional data.

First, on financial issues :

From the American Bankruptcy Institute, a collection of great charts on a variety of consumer finance issues: Chart of the Day

I had heard mention of the Calculated Risk Blog but just getting around to  looking it over. For example, see this new piece on recent trends in consumer debt -- good news in the debt management department:

See: Calculated Risk Blog

Here is the CRBlog's Graph Gallery

Switching gears, here is an interactive chart that allows us to compare gas prices nationally and across cities, states, and times.  See Historical Gas Prices page.